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Palestinian Arab Self-Determination and
Israeli Settlements on the West Bank:
An Analysis of Their Legality Under
International Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The "right of self-determination,"' which has played a pivotal
role in reshaping the map of the post-World War II world, is repeat-
edly asserted on behalf of the Palestinian 2 Arabs in the West Bank 3
and Gaza Strip (Gaza). This comment focuses on the development of
the concept of self-determination, its interpretation by the United Na-
1. Defined as "the right of a nation to constitute an independent state and determine its
own government for itself." A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETER-
MINATION 104 (rev. ed. 1970). See Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 459
(1971). According to Professor Emerson:
[A]ny examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty that while
the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words which have a ring of universal
applicability and perhaps of revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put it into
operation it turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats.
Id.; see also Schoenberg, Limits of Self-Determination, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 91 (1976)
(describing self-determination as "the right of a group to choose its own destiny").
2. According to Eugene Rostow, "[t]he term 'Palestinian' applies to all the peoples who
live or have a right to live in the territory-Jews, Christians and Muslims alike." Rostow,
"Palestinian Self-Determination ": Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Pales-
tine Mandate, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 147, 153 (1979).
3. See S. AVERICK & S. ROSEN, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "WEST BANK" AND GAZA
TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, at 1, n*. (AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations: No. 11 (1985)).
The partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab, was ap-
proved by the United Nations on November 29, 1947. Id. As a result of Arab rejection of the
plan and invasion of the Jewish state, Jordan occupied the western side of the Jordan River.
Id. During the 19 years of Jordanian rule, this area came to be called the West Bank in order
to distinguish it from the east bank of the river. After the Arabs went to war against Israel in
June, 1967, those areas came under Israel's control, which designated the area by its geograph-
ical names, Judea and Samaria. Id.
The continued use of the term West Bank is problematical because it is neither a geo-
graphical nor historical term. Further, it is legally insignificant, as only two countries recog-
nized Jordan's annexation, the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Id. The area, however, was
known as Judea and Samaria from Biblical times through the British mandatory period. The
United Nations also used the terms Judea and Samaria in its deliberations on partition. Id.; see
also infra note 186 and accompanying text.
Thus, Averick and Rosen contend that it is misleading to call the disputed territory,
whose status is subject to negotiations, the West Bank. S. AVERICK & S. ROSEN, supra, at 1.
However, that term is used to refer to the geographical areas of Judea and Samaria because it
is the one used by American policy makers and Middle East analysts. Id.
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tions, and its relevance to the Palestinian Arabs living on the West
Bank and Gaza. While strategic, political, and moral factors are in-
volved, 4 this comment is limited to an analysis of the legal aspects of
Israel's presence on the West Bank, the validity of Israeli settlements
on the West Bank, and the extent to which those settlements affect the
future of the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Aftermath of World War I and the League of Nations
The concept of self-determination, as a goal of national indepen-
dence, was a powerful element in the political development of the
nineteenth century. 5 Two world wars and the events of the twentieth
century brought the seeds of this concept to fruition. 6 However, the
modern view of self-determination steps away from the national sov-
ereignty aspect and focuses on the right of a people to determine its
own future.7 The destruction and death that took place during World
War I presented world leaders with a clear view of the danger of na-
tionalism.8 Thus, after the first World War, Woodrow Wilson intro-
duced the concept of self-determination9 to the Paris Peace
4. Zafren, The Israeli Settlements on the West Bank: Valid Under International Law?,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 3 (Apr. 9, 1980).
5. Blum, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, 10 ISRAEL L. REV.
509, 510 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Blum I]. See Schoenberg, supra note 1, at 91-92. Prior to
World War 1:
[S]elf-determination was restricted . . . to Europeans and European settlers and
their descendants on other continents. The latter achieved self-determination . . . in
a territory defined by the limits of colonial authority ....
Then, with the relative decline of the European imperial powers, the third world
states, working with the communist countries, switched the application of self-deter-
mination from European . . .[ethnic groups] to the European dependencies in Asia
and Africa, returning to the territorial administrative framework in defining the peo-
ples involved.
Id. at 91-92; see also R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF
DECOLONIZATION 3 (Occasional Papers in Inter. Affairs No. 9 Dec. 1964).
6. See Note, Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 139 (1980).
7. Id. at 138.
8. Id. at 139. "The threat and danger of a 'world' war, then as now, advanced the
acceptance of modern self-determination principles as international law." Id.
9. See Pomerane, Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal, 10 ISRAEl.
L. REV. 310 (1984). According to Pomerance, President Wilson's composite concept of self-
determination included the "right of a people to be free from alien rule, and to choose the
sovereignty under which it will live; . . . the right of a people to select its own form of govern-
ment; . ..and continuous consent of the governed in the form of representative democratic
[Vol. 8:551
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Conference, which "treated it as 'a purely political factor and not as a
legal principle applicable to all peoples whose fate has to be deter-
mined.' ,,s Although the Wilsonian concept of self-determination
was applied to Europe and the Ottoman Empire by the Allies and the
League of Nations, I I opinions are divided on the question of whether
this principle has, in the course of time, become a guiding norm of
international law. 12
The League of Nations created a mandate system 13 for colonies
government." Id. at 314-15. See also A. COBBAN, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting R. LANSING,
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97-98 (1921)). Wilson did not realize
the explosiveness of the principle he had set in motion. The "phrase [is] 'loaded with dyna-
mite,' and . . . 'will raise hopes which can never be realized.' " Id.
10. N. FEINBERG, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (1970)
(quoting C. Dupuis, Rdgles gdnirales du droit de la paix, 32 R.A.D.I. 38 (1931)).
11. See Note, supra note 6, at 139. Two non-sovereign territories before World War I,
Poland and Czechoslovakia, declared their independence in 1918 on grounds of nationality.
Id. See also Blum I, supra note 5, at 510. Self-determination was only selectively applied at
the end of World War I. For example, Austria-Hungary and Turkey-the defeated powers-
were dismembered, as were Russia and Germany to a lesser extent. Id.
12. N. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 44-45. See A. COBBAN, supra note 1, at 65. Accord-
ing to Cobban, Wilson failed to realize "how indeterminate a criterion nationality might
be ....... Cobban asserts that "[a]lthough [Wilson] had spoken of self-determination as
though it were an absolute principle of international right, from the very beginning he perforce
allowed competing principles to influence his decisions and derogate from its claims." Id. See
also Ramazani, Self-Determination and the Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 51, 51 (1971). According to Professor Ramazini, "to a significant extent
.. .the principle of self-determination as a moral, not as a legal, principle has gained consid-
erable influence in the international community." Id. Ramazani further notes that in his "re-
view of the principle of self-determination in terms of the changing international system it
would seem to suggest that it has been a principle of political adjustment as well as moral
adjustment." Id. at 52; but see Bassiouni, "Self-Determination" and the Palestinians, 65 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31, 33 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni I]. Bassiouni concedes that
"'self-determination' is not part of customary international law, since the custom and usage of
member states of the world community do not evidence it by their practice." Id. However,
Bassiouni asserts that in light of "the law and practice of the United Nations and the previous
history of 'self-determination,' as a right to exercise collective behavioral freedom of choice,
the conclusion is warranted that it is a general principle of international law recognized by the
world community even though not always applied." Id.; Blum I, supra note 5, at 512. Blum
notes that self-determination was basically restricted to the minority peoples within the de-
feated nations. Id. Blum asserts that the drafters of the Covenant recognized that the princi-
ple of self-determination, if consistently applied, would "clash with ... the cardinal principle
of international law, that is, the sovereignty of states." Id. at 510.
13. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 1, Report to the General Assembly
of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Vol. II Annexes, Appendix and Maps
22, U.N. Doc. A/364 Add. 1 (Sept. 9, 1947), reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 889
(J. Moore ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LEAGUE COVENANT]. See also Rostow, supra note 2,
at 154-55. According to Rostow, the international law of mandates is the foundation underly-
ing the Security Council Resolutions which purport to govern the peace process between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. Id. at 154. After World War I, the Allies did not annex the territory
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and territories unable "to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world .... ,,14 However, the mandatory
power, that is, the nation who assumed administration over the terri-
tory of the mandate at the direction of the League, did not gain sover-
eignty over that territory.' 5 Rather, "[m]ost of the mandates were
trusts for the benefit of the inhabitants."' 6 The omission of the princi-
ple of self-determination from the League's Covenant represented the
drafters' recognition of the inherent conflict between state sover-
eignty, which aims at the preservation of territorial integrity, and self-
determination which "implies the right of every people to political
independence, in essence the right of secession .... ",17
B. The United Nations Charter
After World War II, for a variety of political reasons,18 the prin-
ciple of self-determination could not be omitted from the United Na-
tions Charter as it similarly was from the League Covenant.1 9
However, the principle of state sovereignty was retained as the domi-
of the vanquished on a large scale. Id. "Instead, . . . they restored Poland, and established
several new states in Europe . . . [in the name of self-determination]. Outside Europe, the
Allies took over the administration of a number of territories, which had been "parts of the
Turkish and German empires as mandates of the League of Nations." Id. at 154-55. The
Mandate system preceded the Trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter. The
League founders established the Mandate system to "liberate peoples who had lived in the
colonies and protectorates of empire, and to launch their new states on a footing of dignity and
equality." Id.
14. LEAGUE COVENANT, supra note 13, art. 22, para. 1; see also Rostow, supra note 2, at
154.
15. Rostow, supra note 2, at 155.
16. Id.
17. Blum I, supra note 5, at 510. Self-determination was omitted from the League Cove-
nant because the internal conflict could not be reconciled. Blum argues that theoretically, it
may be possible to reconcile the two concepts.
If sovereignty is interpreted not as the unlimited power of a state to act as it pleases
but rather as the residuum of power which it possesses within the confines laid down
by international law (and it is this latter meaning that must nowadays be regarded as
the correct one), then it is possible to suggest that both sovereignty and self-determi-
nation be incorporated within the same legal system.
Id.
However, Blum asserts that in reality, what is involved is the conflict between legitimacy,
representing sovereignty, and revolution representing self-determination. Id. Thus, any at-
tempt to recognize self-determination as a "legally recognized right amounts to an attempt to
legitimize revolution and to absorb it into the existing legal system." Id. at 511.
18. See A. COBBAN, supra note 1, passim.
19. Blum I, supra note 5, at 511. See A. COBBAN, supra note 1, at 75. Cobban posits that
"the forces antagonistic to the principle of self-determination [at the time of the peace confer-
ence] were strong enough to hold it in check." Id. However, after World War I, "[n]ational
feeling [was] now so strong an element in the political consciousness of the world that no
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nant concept in Article 2 of the Charter, the "Principles" section.20
Article 2 includes the principle of "sovereign equality of states,"' 2 1 the
abstention from "the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state," 22 and the non-interven-
tion into the domestic affairs of member states.
23
By contrast, self-determination, as referred to in the "Purposes"
section of the Charter, articulates the development of friendly rela-
tions among states based on the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. 24 Thus, sovereignty was conceived of "as
an operative principle of the Charter. . .[whereas self-determination]
was one of the desiderata of the Charter rather than a legal right that
could be invoked as such."' 25 Additionally, Article 55 associates self-
determination with the achievement of goals within the areas of edu-
cation, employment, and economic and social progress.
26
Furthermore, a number of resolutions adopted by the United Na-
tions after 1948 have affected the fragile balance between sovereignty
and self-determination as reflected in the United Nations Charter.
27
These declarations purport to elevate self-determination to an interna-
tionally recognized legal right.28 Although the Charter avoids men-
settlement which [did] violence on an extensive scale to this feeling [was] likely to be ac-
cepted .... " Id. at 293-94. Furthermore, Cobban notes that:
[N]ations have learnt that military conquest and annexation are not as successful as
the bases of empire as they formerly were. Political consciousness has become a fact
of world-wide significance. . . .Even the strongest alien power can only keep a
small people in subjection, as the USSR does its satellite states in Europe, with the
aid of a party inside the state.
Id. at 306.
Further, Cobban asserts that a different, though allied set of ideals were substituted in the
1919 negotiations for that of self-determination, i.e., a belief in small states, the equality of
states, and absolute national sovereignty. Id. at 76-82. However, because of circumstances,
limitations were placed on the practical realization of self-determination at the Peace Confer-
ence. Id. at 104.
20. Blum I, supra note 5, at 511.
21. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 [hereinafter cited as U.N. CHARTER].
See also Blum I, supra note 5, at 511; Pomerance, supra note 9, at 316.
22. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 4.
23. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 21, art. 1(2). See also Blum I, supra note 5, at 511;
Pomerance, supra note 9, at 316-17.
24. Blum I, supra note 5, at 511.
25. Id. (emphasis in original). The term "desiderata" has been defined as "something
desired as essential or needed." WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 611 (3d ed. 1961).
26. Blum I, supra note 5, at 511.
27. See infra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text.
28. Blum I, supra note 5, at 511. See also N. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 47-48 (quoting
M. BEDJAOUi, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 242 (1961)). The principle of self-
determination should be incorporated in the Charter, but only as a "fundamental principle of
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tion of the term self-determination in connection with colonially
dependent peoples, the United Nations has become pre-eminent in es-
pousing the "demand for an end to alien subjugation from abroad,
based on a doctrine of racial inequality."
29
Enlarged with numerous new African states, the General Assem-
bly, in 1960, adopted its well-known Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 0 which proclaimed
the right of "all peoples . . . to self-determination," i.e., the right to
"freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural developments." '3' Moreover, in two 1966 Covenants
on Human Rights,3 2 which state that peoples may pursue their eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and political development, self-determination
is enumerated as a human right.33 Additionally, the 1970 Declaration
international morality .... Little by little the United Nations sought to go beyond the
purely moral limits of this principle into a precise rule of law with clearly defined methods of
enforcement." Id. Emerson, supra note 1, at 461 (quoting Gross, The Right of Self-Determi-
nation in International Law, in NEW STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD (M. Kilson ed. 1975)).
Professor Leo Gross argues that:
[S]ubsequent practice as an element of interpretation does not support the proposi-
tion that the principle of self-determination is to be interpreted as a right or that
human rights provisions have come to be interpreted as rights with corresponding
obligations either generally or specifically with respect to the right of self-
determination.
Id. (emphasis in original); but see Note, supra note 6, at 142 n.30. According to the author,
self-determination has matured into a full-fledged, recognized right in international law. Id. at
142. Dr. Higgins finds inescapable the conclusion that self-determination has developed into
an international legal right. "To insist [that self-determination remains a mere principle] is to
fail to give any weight . . . to the practice of states as revealed by unanimous and consistent
behavior." Emerson, supra note 1, at 460-61 (quoting R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 101-02
(1963)).
29. Schoenberg, supra note 1, at 93.
30. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
31. Id. See Pomerance, supra note 9, at 317; Rostow, supra note 2, at 153. As for the
term "all peoples," Rostow asserts that:
[D]espite its great political appeal, the idea of 'self-determination' for 'all peoples' is a
puzzling and complex factor in the political life of an international system based on
the existence and sanctity of states, because [m]ost states include more than one peo-
ple: Spain has Basque and Catalans; France, Bretons; Belgium, Walloons and Flem-
ish; Canada, a considerable French-speaking population. The Soviet Union is. . . a
combination of many peoples, widely different in language, religion, and culture. Al-
most all the African states include a number of tribes.
Id.; see also Pomerance, supra note 9, at 313; and infra note 58 and accompanying text.
32. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights); G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) [hereinafter cited as
Covenants on Human Rights].
33. See Bassiouni I, supra note 12, at 32 (at the time of the League of Nations, the princi-
ple of self-determination was applied to nationalities as a question of minorities' rights. Subse-
19861 Palestinian Self-Determination
on Friendly Relations 34 assigns to every member state the duty to pro-
mote self-determination and to refrain from deprivation of this right
through the use of force.
35
Thus, self-determination in the 1950's and 1960's became synon-
ymous with de-colonization, 36 where "'[t]he subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation . . . constitutes a de-
nial of fundamental rights,' violates the Charter, and impedes world
peace."' 37 Moreover, according to United Nations Resolution 1514,
colonialism was to be ended speedily and abruptly, and armed force
proscribed against "dependent peoples" who were entitled to "com-
plete independence" and respect for the "integrity of their national
territory."'38 These postulates of United Nations Resolution 1514 set
up a working formula which imposed an overall pattern implementing
self-determination within the context of de-colonization.
39
However, the aforementioned pronouncements are legally ques-
tionable. 40 For example, the General Assembly resolutions declare
that "all peoples have the right of self-determination," but there is no
mention of such a right in the Charter.41 In other words, which par-
ticular groups will be allowed self-determination is decided by the rel-
quently, the United Nations pursued this theme as one of human rights). See Green, Self-
Determination and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 4945 (1971) (dis-
cussing Covenants on Human Rights, supra note 32). These resolutions affirm that the rights
to which they refer "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person." Id.
34. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
(Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations).
35. Id. See also Blum, supra note 5, at 512.
36. De-colonization has been described as the terminating of colonial rule of the Euro-
pean powers in Africa and Asia. Blum I, supra note 5, at 512.
37. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960),
quoted in Pomerance, supra note 9, at 317-18.
38. Id.
39. R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 27-28. As stated by Professor Rostow:
(1) All dependent peoples are entitled to freedom; (2) The people so entitled are
defined in terms of the existing colonial territories, each of which contains a nation;
(3) Once such a people has come to independence, no residual right of self-determi-
nation remains with any group within it or cutting across its frontiers.
Id. See also Schoenberg, supra note 1, at 100. According to the Burmese representative at the
special U.N. committee that formulated the Declaration on Friendly Relations the "sum total
of the experience gained by the United Nations in the implementation of [self-determination is]
.. .that it was relevant only to colonialism .... ." Id. According to Schoenberg, Asians
and Africans, dreading separatist movements, opposed any further extension of self-determina-
tion. Id.; see also Blum I, supra note 5, at 513.
40. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 318.
41. Id. (" 'all peoples' can never have the right (of self-determination], if that right is
synonymous with the right to full independence").
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ative power possessed by the dominant and oppressed groups as well
as by the competing states, not because of any legal right.42 The
Charter also does not require the preservation of the territorial integ-
rity of a colonial unit where a geographical division is a better way to
preserve self-government.
43
On a practical level, self-determination is relatively uncompli-
cated when applied to colonial subjects and their masters. 44 The basic
principle is that alien rule should give way to rule by the people of the
country concerned. 45 However, the issue is more complex when cen-
tered upon the relationships between local populations within a single
territory, or between neighbors in adjoining territories.46
Moreover, the maintenance of law and order in a territory ad-
ministered by a colonial power may require the use of force. Article
2(4) of the Charter only precludes the force used against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of member states.47 Thus,
"now only certain states are enjoined from using force, while other
'peoples' and states are permitted and even encouraged to do so."'48
The Declaration on Colonialism is legally objectionable because its
mandatory language suggests that the General Assembly is competent
to amend the Charter without adhering to the proper amendment
process. 49 Additionally, in referring to the "territorial integrity of a
country," paragraph 6 of the Declaration on Colonialism incorporates
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 25.
45. Id.
46. Id. See Green, supra note 33, at 40. According to Green, "[ifn any case, not every
multi-national state is considered as being ripe for a full exercise of self-determination if the
consequence of such an exercise would be to break up the state into its alleged constituent
parts, each measured by its tribal, religious, ethnic, or racial composition." Id. at 47.
47. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 318 and 334.
48. Id. at 334.
49. Id. at 318. See also R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 25; Slonim, Book Review, 6 JERU-
SALEM J. INT'L REL. (1982-83) (reprint) (reviewing J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: As-
SAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1981)). According to Slonim, Stone believes that to
delegitimize Israel, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People, established in 1977, contended on the one hand, that the 1947 Partition Resolution
adopted by the Assembly was without force and, therefore, is illegal. It thus branded "Israel
as an outlaw legally obliged to surrender territory and status to the Palestinians," and justified
the Arab invasion of Palestine in 1948. Id. at 1. On the other hand, the Committee wished to
bind Israel to certain aspects of the Partition Resolution and to impart a mandatory quality to
post-1967 General Assembly resolutions dealing with Palestine, although the General Assem-
bly only has power to bind member states on such issues as the United Nations budget and
administrative matters. Id. at 2, 3. "Resolutions of the General Assembly remain mere rec-
ommendations no matter how frequently adopted and no matter with what majority. It is
[Vol. 8:551
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two contradictory principles, self-determination and territorial integ-
rity, in one document. 50 More importantly, no answers are given in
the Declaration or subsequent documents as to which principle is to
be applied. 51 As a result, a double standard intrudes because a selec-
tive process is used in applying either one or the other principle.
5 2
precisely because all states realize the non-binding nature of Assembly resolutions that [they]
• . . are adopted with such lopsided majorities. They obligate no one ....... Id. at 3.
According to Professor Green, General Assembly resolutions are "nothing more than
recommendations, even though they enjoy some measure of moral force." Id. Green notes
that:
To the extent that [the General Assembly resolutions] may have been regularly voted
for by the same states may indicate that these states considered themselves to be
obliged to recognize such rights, while a consistent practice over a period of years
might indicate the development of a new rule of customary law to this effect,
although it is doubtful how far this would bind any Member which had voted nega-
tively or had consistently abstained, and there would be even less legal effect insofar
as non-Members of the United Nations are concerned. Moreover, the fact that there
may have developed such a rule of international law with regard to the right of self-
determination does not mean that it always existed, and it is perhaps doubtful
whether the recognition of such a right could operate retroactively.
Green, supra note 33, at 45; see also infra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Zafren,
supra note 4, at 13. Zafren, referring to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Opinion of 6/
21/71, infra note 121, notes that "the Court, . . . while indicating that each Security Council
Resolution and its surrounding history would have to be examined to determine whether it
imposes any legal duty on or affects legally the right of any state, states that such resolutions
can and do have legal effect." Id.; see Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Contin-
uing Validity of Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977).
According to Watson, Security Council resolutions do not create international law because the
"power to make authoritarian interpretations of Article 2(7) [of the Charter] has not been
yielded by the states to the political organs of the United Nations and that the power of
autointerpretation thus still rests with the member states." Id.; see also Yost, 65 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 52 (1971). According to Yost, summarizing Professor Green's comments,
U.N. resolutions
are only recommendatory, [in] that they are almost invariably limited to former colo-
nial territories and that U.N. Members are on the whole extremely cautious about
applying the principle of self-determination to the metropolitan territory of Member
States, [because] . . . if this principle should be sweepingly and indiscriminately ap-
plied there, it could easily effect the break-up of most of the Members.
Id. at 52; Emerson, supra note 1, at 460. But see Higgins, The United Nations and Lawmaking:
the Political Organs, 64 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 37, 43 (1970). Higgins asserts that "[w]hat
is required is an examination of whether resolutions with similar content, repeated through
time, voted for by overwhelming majorities, giving rise to a general [legal opinion], has created
the norm in question." Id. at 43. Thus, the key issue in the cumulative effect of such resolu-
tions is to determine the "emergence of rules of general customary law" rather than the non-
binding character of Assembly resolutions. Emerson, supra note 1, at 460.
50. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 318-19.
51. Id. at 319.
52. Blum I, supra note 5, at 512. According to Blum, after World War I, self-determina-
tion was basically restricted to minorities within the defeated nations. In the 1950's and
1960's, self-determination became synonymous with the de-colonization of Africa and Asia.
However, "mere substitution of independence for colonial rule does not of itself ensure self-
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For example, the restriction of self-determination to colonial peoples
has not been followed by the United Nations in the case of the Pales-
tinian Arabs.5 3
C. Problems Associated with the Concept of Self-Determination
Although there is neither a precise definition of self-determina-
tion, nor a definite, single standard which may be applied under cer-
tain specified conditions, self-determination essentially posits that a
group defined by its common history, tradition, language, and ethnic
background has a right to "choose its own destiny. '5 4 To Woodrow
Wilson, self-determination was another word for popular sover-
eignty. 55 Yet, although "self-determination has been a major force
during most of this century,"' 56 no adequate definition of what consti-
tutes a people or a group exists5 7 Therefore, it is essential to establish
who bears the right of self-determination.58 The problem of defining
self-determination, however, extends beyond the territorial or ethnic
criteria of a "race, a territorial area, or a community. '5 9
It is necessary to determine what methods are permissible to ef-
determination .. " Id. The ethnic and national absurdities carved out by the Congress of
Berlin 100 years ago are now sacrosanct boundaries of independent African States. The
boundaries which group nations and tribes together have little in common except their colonial
masters. Id. The people who were not subjected to the rule of colonial power, i.e., "Lithuani-
ans, Latvians, Estonians, Basques and Catalonians are apparently denied the right to demand
secession from the Soviet Union and Spain, respectively." Id. at 513.
53. Schoenberg, supra note 1, at 102-03. Noting the striking parallel between Israel and
Czechoslovakia, Schoenberg describes how both were accused of endangering world peace by
denying Palestinian Arab and Sudeten German self-determination. Nazi Germany used self-
determination to disguise and justify territorial expansion at Czechoslovakia's expense, and the
Arab States also use self-determination at Israel's expense by accusing Israel of "endangering
world peace by denying. .. Palestinian Arabs the 'legitimate rights' they insist upon." Id. at
103.
54. Id. at 91.
55. A. COBBAN, supra note 1, at 63 (asserting that "the idealization of democracy was an
essential part of Wilsonian ideology").
56. Freidlander, The PLO and the Rule of Law, 10 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLY 221.
229 (1981).
57. Id. at 229-30.
58. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 312.
59. Id. (quoting Lansing, Self-Determination, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Apr. 9, 1921,
at 7). See also R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 27. The question also arises as to whether or not
self-determination should be recognized as a universal and continuing right for all people or as
a right which is extinguished after a one-time exercise. Id. Emerson asserts that self-determi-
nation "once exercised [has] no justification for a reappearance on the scene. It represents no
continuing process, but has only the function of bringing independence to people under alien
rule." Id. at 29; see also Blum I, supra note 5, at 513. Pomerance queries, "[w]hat happens
when new demands for secession arise? Is a limit to be set to the process of self-determination,
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fectuate self-determination, 60 such as who may participate, what is the
status of former residents and new immigrants, who determines which
options are placed before the electorate, and who within the commu-
nity speaks for and binds the community. 6' Additional problems to
be resolved include defining the boundaries, the inhabitants, the mem-
bers of a race or community, and the critical time period involved.
62
Thus, any definition of self-determination involves a complex inter-
play between territorial boundaries, group affiliation, and time.
63
Moreover, self-determination claims may also clash with opposing
self-determination claims. 64 If so, the recognition of the rights of one
claim often entails the denial of rights to a competing claim. 65
or should the process be seen as continuing and open-ended?" Pomerance, supra note 9, at
314.
60. These methods may include, independence, free association, merger and federation,
or any other freely determined status which, while providing self-government, also provided
the "benefits of association with a larger state and presumably representation by it in the world
at large." Emerson, supra note 1, at 470. See Note, supra note 6, at 153-55; see also Pomer-
ance, supra note 9, at 327; Meron, Settlement in the Middle East: What Would It Look Like
And Can We Get There From Here?, 77 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 271, 275-76 (1985). Ac-
cording to Meron, Professor of Law at New York University, "[a]nything that would be ac-
ceptable to the 'self' . . . through an exercise of free will, such as plebiscite or a referendum, is
an expression of self-determination." Id. According to Meron, "[h]istory shows that there is a
wide range of procedures that work when they are freely accepted by all the principal actors
. ..[f]or example, autonomy, which when agreed upon may be an adequate expression of self-
determination." Id. at 276.
61. See, e.g., Pomerance, supra note 9, at 315-16; R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 27.
62. See Pomerance, supra note 9, at 313. Pomerance asks "[w]hich is the critical point in
the seamless web of history for determining the population to be deemed 'indigenous'?" Id. at
323. For example, "are the present inhabitants of the Falklands 'indigenous' after 150 years or
are they alien intruders into Argentina's domain? After 250 years of settlement in Gibraltar, is
the population still to be deemed, as Spain argues, a non-indigenous population .... T' Id.
at 313.
63. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 312.
64. Id. at 313.
65. Id.
(a) The demand for secession or separate self-determination, by one 'self'
clashes with the claim to territorial integrity or political independence put forward by
the unit of which the first 'self' is felt to be a part.
(b) 'Self-determination' by the smaller unit conflicts with the 'self-determina-
tion' to which the larger unit claims to be entitled.
(c) There is an opposition between two claims to territorial integrity-that of
the larger as against that of the smaller unit.
There may also be competing claims by different ethnic groups-Arabs and
Jews, immigrant Indians and native Fijians, whites and blacks in South Africa-to
the same territorial area.
Inherently, self-determination, in the sense of full independence and sovereignty,
cannot be given to all peoples, unless the 'self' is reduced to the individual 'self' of
the term's metaphysical origin. For the very act of fulfilling one claimant's right of
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The problems of defining self-determination have not been re-
solved by the United Nations in a satisfactory or principled way.
66
United Nations Declaration 151467 neither gives precision to the con-
cept nor defines the frequently utilized term "peoples."' 68 Moreover,
the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541,
dealing with dependent territories, defines free association but does
not specify to whom the categories of association and self-government
apply.69
However, the United Nations has opted for a territorial standard
in defining self-determination (i.e., every colonial territory is entitled
to self-determination, regardless of size),70 but this standard has not
been universally applied. For example, colonies have been split on
ethnic grounds. 71 Additionally, the territorial criterion has not been
applied to areas annexed by powerful neighbors, even though they
were not formerly a part of the colonial boundaries.
72
The United Nations is also silent as to what conditions trigger
the transformation of the principle of self-determination into an oper-
ative right.73 Whether a neighbor's claim is legitimate may depend on
who that neighbor is (i.e., a powerful neighbor coveting a small col-
ony), and whether the General Assembly perceives the neighbor's act
self-determination will generally constitute the denial of the claim of another con-
tender to the right.
Id.
66. Id. at 327 (asserting that, "unlike most self-determination cases which reach the UN,
in this instance the sovereign equality and continued existence of a member state are at issue
and not merely the claims of states to recover sovereignty over contiguous territory"). See also
Blum I, supra note 5, at 514 (Blum cannot "refrain from noting that what stands out here is
the utter insincerity with which the principle of self-determination has been manipulated by
the international community to suit changing political needs"). Id. Blum further notes that
"[i]n this sad picture of double-talk and inconsistency there are probably only two constant
factors that enable rival concepts of sovereignty and self-determination to coexist peacefully
side by side: . . . the ability of [any given people] to implement its right to self-determination
• . . [and the] support [of] sovereignty at home and self-determination abroad ...... Id.
67. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 327.
68. Freidlander, supra note 56, at 230.
69. Id.
70. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 322.
71. For example, "Ruanda-Urundi emerged as Rwanda and Burundi . .. the British
Cameroons were divided into north and south for the purposes of holding referenda, and each
section opted for a different political status: the north acceded to Nigeria, the south to the
state of Cameroon." The emergence from the Pacific Trust territory has proceeded on the
basis of the fragmentation, rather than the unity of territory. See id. at 322.
72. "India, for example, annexed Hyderabad, Sikkim, part of Kashmir, and Goa .. .
West Irian and East Timor were incorporated into Indonesia, ... and Ifni into Morocco."
Id.
73. R. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 462-63.
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of incorporation as a "colonial" or "non-colonial" act. 74 Thus, the
objective territorial criterion in defining what constitutes a "colonial"
relationship becomes a subjective exercise as perceived by the General
Assembly.
75
The most obvious use of the subjective criterion, as opposed to
the territorial criterion, is apparent in situations where the ethnic
makeup of a territory has changed significantly over time.76 Forced
and voluntary population movements are constant features of interna-
tional relations, particularly during and following wars and periods of
instability. 77 Thus, the question arises as to which population is to be
considered the majority to whom self-determination attaches.
78
In the Middle East,79 the question of which of the present popu-
lations is indigenous to Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon has been the sub-
ject of heated debate by the principals involved, as well as others.
80
Subjective criteria have been used by the United Nations to determine
which population is indigenous to the area.8 1 Third World States in-
creasingly perceive Israel as a European, Western, "non-indigenous"
settler population.8 2 However, this perception overlooks, by igno-
rance or design, not only the historic connection of the Jewish people
with Israel, but also the fact that the present Jewish population of
Israel is predominantly Middle Eastern in origin.8 3 Unlike most situ-
ations in which the self-determination claims concern the recovery of
sovereignty over contiguous territory, in this instance, the sovereign
equality and continued existence of a member state are at issue.
8 4





79. Israel is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea, on the north by Lebanon, on
the northeast by Syria, on the east by Jordan, on the south by Aqaba, and on the southwest by
Sinai and Egypt. See L. DAVIS, MYTHS AND FACTS 42 (1984).
80. See Pomerance, supra note 9, at 326.
81. Id. at 326.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Schoenberg, supra note 1, at 101 (quoting U Thant, U.N. Press Release 5 G/SM/
1201 of Jan. 19, 1970). U Thant stressed that "[w]hen a state applied to be a Member of the
United Nations, and when the United Nations accepts that Member, then the implication is
that the rest of the membership of the United Nations recognized the territorial integrity,
independence and sovereignty of that particular Member State." Id.
1986]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 8:551
D. Self-Determination and the Palestinian Arabs
Separating the "intertwined territorial, ethnic and time factors""5
is an acute problem in the demand for Palestinian 86 self-determination
and the General Assembly's repeated assertions of the "right of re-
turn" under international law for Palestinian refugees.8 7 These pro-
nouncements raise many unanswered questions, such as the following:
to which territorial unit does this "right" attach; which Palestinians
are included; 8 whether security considerations are to be set aside and
85. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 325.
86. See supra note 2.
87. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 325-26. See generally Radley, The Palestinian Refugees:
The Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 586, 586 (quoting G.A. Res.
3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)) ("among the rights
affirmed. . . is 'the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property
from which they have been displaced and uprooted' . .. .").
Radley notes that Resolution 3236 is the first Assembly resolution to "eschew the term
,refugee,' " thus viewing the problem of displaced Palestinians as one of a people denied its
national rights, rather than a refugee problem. Id. at 606. According to Radley, G.A. Res.
3236 appears to reaffirm a previous resolution that displaced Palestinians not only have the
right to return to the area they fled in Israel, but have the right to do so within the overall
context of self-determination. Id. at 606 (discussing G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 30) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973)). Radley asserts that Resolution 3236 not only
renders meaningless the concept of sovereign equality of states by giving the Palestinians the
absolute right of return to Israeli territory despite any objections Israel might have, but also
endows the displaced Palestinians with the right to return to preserve a separate national iden-
tity. Id. at 607. Radley notes that it is "difficult to imagine how much closer the General
Assembly could have come to endorsing the destruction, in part or whole, of a member state."
Id.
88. According to Joan Peters, journalist and author, the most widely held assumption
regarding the Arab-Jewish Conflict is not true. Reich, Population and Politics (Book Review),
ATLANTIC, July 1984, at 110 (reviewing J. PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS
OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984)). That assumption conceives of a
"native" Palestinian population settled in Palestine "from time immemorial" until late-coming
Zionists, backed by colonial powers, created the State of Israel, thus usurping the Palestinian
homeland and forcing a Palestinian exodus. Reich, supra, at 110; see also Bassiouni I, supra
note 12, at 34.
Peters conducted a study of the Arab refugees in the course of preparing a documentary
on effects of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In a complex demographic analysis of the Jewish and
Arab populations in various parts of Palestine, Peters shows that, from approximately 1893 to
the eve of the 1948 War, there was a substantial Arab migration in the parts of Palestine
settled by Jews. The sparse population along the Palestine coast included a variety of ethnic
people many of whom were not Arab. Peters, supra, at 261. Hence, rather than having been a
people settled in its native land from time immemorial, a large part of the pre-1948 Arab
population had migrated into areas of Jewish settlement either from outside the area or from
other parts of Palestine. Sanders, Demography and Destiny (Book Review), THE NEW REPUB-
LIC, Apr. 23, 1984, at 38-39 (reviewing J. PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS
OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984)). This explains why the definition
of a refugee from Palestine in 1948 is a person who lived there for just two years because many
Arab residents in 1948 had immigrated so recently. Pipes, Refugees? (Book Review), COM-
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a hostile population admitted; and whether the "right of return" is
meant to insure self-determination for the Palestinians even at the ex-
pense of Israeli self-determination and existence.
8 9
Professor Julius Stone, an acclaimed international legal scholar,90
argues that there is no "right of return" under international law for
Palestinian Arabs. 91 The underlying assumption of this "right" is
that the "Israel-Arab" question arises from an encroachment by the
state of Israel on some international law right of self-determination of
a Palestinian Arab nation. 92 Stone asserts that "[t]his assumption
MENTARY, July 1984, at 60, (reviewing J. PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL:THE ORIGINS
OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984)). The usual definition would have
cut out a substantial portion of the persons who later claimed to be refugees from Palestine.
Id. Thus, contrary to the standard myth of Jewish immigrants having "displaced" an indige-
nous Arab peasantry, this immigration was created by the Jewish redevelopment which at-
tracted large numbers of Arab people. Sanders, supra, at 39. See also Stone, Peace and the
Palestinians, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 136.
The assertion that Israel came into existence on the basis of injustice to the Palestin-
ian people distorts historical fact. The Arab claimant after World War I included
Arabs throughout the entire area. The Palestinian Arabs were merely peripheral
rather than a distinctive segment whose interests as such were taken into account.
Consequently, to present a Palestinian "entity" and people, presumably emergent in
the 1960's, as a claimant against Israel now, is an unwarranted and dubious game
with history.
Id. at 139; see also Peretz, Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CON-
FLICT, supra note 13, at 73. Peretz asserts that "[t]he national identity of the Palestine Arabs
has gone through a cycle of: discovery in the 1920's, political failure in the 1930s, near aban-
donment in the 1940's, disillusionment in the 1950's and 1960's, and rebirth, rediscovery and
new expectations since 1967." Id. at 74. Further, Peretz notes that "[pirior to establishment
of the British Mandate at the end of World War I, there was no distinctive Palestinian people
nor political entity ...... Id. Peretz contends that "[o]nly after the establishment of the
British Mandate in 1920, and the rise of Jewish nationalism in the country did a distinctive
Palestinian Arab consciousness emerge in response to the challenge of these two forms of
European intrusion." Id.; cf Cattan, Sovereignty over Palestine, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CON-
FLICT, supra note 13, at 11. Cattan argues that the "title of the Palestinian Arabs to Palestine
• . . rests upon their ownership of the country from time immemorial. . . . The Arabs, in-
cluding the Palestinians are pre-Islamic people. They lived in Palestine and other parts of the
Middle East before the advent of Islam and the Moslem conquest." Id. at 13-14.
89. Pomerance, supra note 9, at 326-27. See also Radley, supra note 87, at 604-05 (Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions passed in 1969 "raise not only the issue of Palestinian repatriation
but also that of Palestinian self-determination, in terms such as to raise in the minds of many
observers the question whether these resolutions were consistent with Israeli sovereignty and
independence and even Israel's right to exist.").
90. Noted jurist, author, and professor of law at the University of California, Hastings
College of Law.
91. Slonim, supra note 49, at 1. See generally Radley, supra note 87, at 586-614.
92. Peretz, Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT,
supra note 13, at 73. Peretz asserts that "there is no distinctive Palestinian people, nor polit-
ical entity." Id. at 74. Furthermore, "[t]he land and its inhabitants were considered backwa-
ter regions of the less-developed Ottoman Syrian provinces." Id.
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. . .is based on the historical fallacy that the contending claims in the
crucial period 1917-1919 were those of the Jews against those of the
Palestinians." 93 Rather, Stone points out that the two contenders for
self-determination in the Middle East at that time were the Arab and
Jewish peoples. 94 The United Nations Partition Resolution, in re-
sponse to their claims, apportioned the overwhelming share of terri-
tory and resources to the Arabs.95 Palestine alone, however, was
designated for the Jewish people.96 Even that small allotment was
dramatically reduced when Palestine was divided into two parts: the
west bank of the Jordan river extending to the Mediterranean was
earmarked for Jewish development, ultimately to become the state of
Israel, while the east bank was reserved for Arab development, ulti-
mately to become the Palestinian state of Transjordan (today
Jordan).
97
Stone posits that "the principle of self-determination was thus
more than satisfied in relation to the Arab nations, and that any
claims which the Palestinians now seek to raise should be directed to
the vast territory of the Arab States."
'98
III. THE HISTORICAL LEGAL CHARACTER OF ISRAEL'S
PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK
Understanding the debate concerning the legality of Israel's sta-
93. Slonim, supra note 49, at 1. See also supra notes 2 and 87 and accompanying text.
94. Slonim, supra note 49 at 1. See also Stone, Peace and Palestine, in THE ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 147. Stone asserts that -[a]s a matter of historical fact, the princi-
pal claimants in the distribution of the vast, formerly Turkish territories embracing the whole
of the Near and Middle East were the Arab and Jewish peoples." Id. at 138.
Furthermore, the territory designated for the Jewish people comprised Cisjordan and
Transjordan, an area situated on both sides of the Jordan River and within the mandate
granted by the League of Nations in 1922. Id. at 147. Despite Jewish protests, the lands east
of the Jordan were separated from the "Jewish National Home" as provided for in the man-
date and allocated to the creation in Palestine of an independent Arab State-Jordan. Id.
Thus, Jordan constituted the Arab state within Palestine. Id. The West Bank, Gaza, and
Jerusalem remained within the area provided for the "Jewish National Home" until the estab-
lishment in 1948 of the state of Israel. Jordan, in the subsequent Arab attack, seized the West
Bank and East Jerusalem. Id. Stone further observes that "the real question of self-determina-
tion centers on the raison d'etre of the Kingdom of Jordan if not as the Palestine Arab State."
Id. at 149.
95. See id.




tus on the West Bank, requires a review of the history of the area.99
The problems inherent in the West Bank controversy can be traced to
unresolved issues left by the Palestine mandate and the 1948-49
War. 0 0
A. The League of Nations Mandate
The historical dimension of the inseparable bond of the Jewish
people with the land of Israel is an integral part of world history.10'
There has been a continuous Jewish presence in the land of Israel
since ancient times. 0 2 Furthermore, the League of Nations Mandate
for Palestine emphasized "the historical connection of the Jewish peo-
ple with Palestine and . . . the grounds for reconstituting their na-
tional home in that country." 10 3 Thus, the mandatory power had the




Unlike other mandates, the Palestine mandate was established
under Article 22(8) of the League Covenant "which authorized the
League Council explicitly to define the terms of a Mandate when the
broad general statements of paragraph I was insufficient."'10 5 The
99. A. GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (1978). See
also Zafren, supra note 4, at 4.
100. Id. at 40-41.
101. Blum, Judea, Samaria and Gaza-The Israeli Record 3 (statements in the Security
Council, March 13 and 19, 1979, abridged version) (quoting J. PARKES, WHOSE LAND? 10
(1971)) [hereinafter cited as Blum II].
The Land of Israel is intertwined far more intimately into the religious and historical
memories of the Jewish people: for their connection with the country has been of
much longer duration-in fact, it has been continuous from the second millenium
B.C.E. up to modern times-and their religious literature is more intimately con-
nected with its history, its climate and its soil. The Land, therefore, has provided an
emotional centre which has endured through the whole of their period of 'exile' and
has led to constant returns or attempted returns culminating in our own day in the
Zionist Movement ....
Id. at 4.
Moreover, Judaism is tied "to the history of a single people and the geographical actuality
of a single land." Id. at 3 (quoting J. PARKES, supra); cf H. CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 3 (1973). Cattan claims a presence of Palestinians in Palestine since earliest
recorded history. According to Cattan, Palestinians are descendants of the Canaanites who
were the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine. Id. at 3, 7.
102. Blum II, supra note 101, at 4.
103. The Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on
July 24, 1922, and the Memorandum by the British Government Relating to its Application to
Transjordan Approved by the Council of the League on Sept. 16, 1922: Report to the General
Assembly of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Vol. II, Annexes, Appendix
and Maps 18-22, U.N. Doc. A/364 Add. 1 (Sept. 9, 1947).
104. Id. at 893. See also Rostow, supra note 2, at 155.
105. Rostow, supra note 2, at 155. According to Rostow, the administration of territories
which had been part of the Turkish and German empires and certain territories in South West
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Preamble to the Palestine mandate incorporated the Balfour Declara-
tion, which called for the "establishment of a national home for the
Jewish people in Palestine."' 10 6 The mandate gave priority to the na-
tional aspirations of a non-inhabitant people-the dispersed Jewish
people-over the current indigenous population, 0 7 making it unique
among mandated territories.10  Thus, Palestine had two beneficiaries,
the indigenous Arab population and the Jewish people throughout the
world. 109
Moreover, the mandatory power was specifically instructed to fa-
cilitate Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and could
"postpone or withhold" the application of Articles to the mandate in
the area east of Jordan." 0 This proviso, however, did not apply to
Jewish rights of immigration and close settlement in the West Bank
and Gaza. I I
Regarding the validity and binding nature of the Palestine man-
date on the parties concerned, two general schools of thought exist.
Africa, were taken over by the Allies as mandates. Id. at 154, 156-58. The administration of
the Palestine Mandate, however, was assumed under art. 22(8). Id. at 155. Article 22(8) of
the League Covenant provides that "[tihe degree of authority, control, or administration to be
exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the
League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council." LEAGUE COVENANT, supra note
13, art. 22; see also supra text accompanying notes 13-17; see CRESCENT AND STAR 217 (N.
Kittrie & Y. Alexander eds. 1973) which states:
The Jews lived in Palestine from about 1200 B.C. until the Roman destruction of the
Jerusalem Temple in 70 A.D. Palestine then became a Roman province until it was
conquered by the invading Arabs in 637 A.D. In the next thirteen centuries the area
changed hands from one domination to another. Since 1071 Palestine was ruled by
Seljuk Turks, the Crusaders, the Kurds, the Mamelukes, and from 1516 by the Otto-
man Turks who, after the First World War, renounced their rights to the land. The
British Mandate in Palestine, which followed, lasted until May 14, 1948.
Id. at 217.
106. A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 43.
107. Id.
108. Id. "The fact that the Palestine mandate was "sui generis' in the Mandate System in
no way detracts from its legality." Id. Article I extended the mandatory's role from adminis-
trative advice and assistance to administration and legislation; article 4 required the
mandatory power to seek the advice of the Jewish Agency in matters affecting the Jewish
National Home and interests of the Jews in Palestine; article 7 required the mandatory to assist
Jews permanently residing in Palestine to acquire Palestinian citizenship; article 22 made He-
brew a national language. Id. at 85 n.18.
109. Id. at 43. See also Rostow, supra note 2, at 155. Rostow asserts that the case for
treating the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as "Arab" territory is not helped by contending
that the existing population of the area is largely Arab. That was true for all of Palestine,
except Jerusalem, when the mandate was established. Jewish settlement in a land then popu-
lated mainly by Arabs is what the mandate specifically authorizes. Id. at 161.
110. See Rostow, supra note 2, at 156.
111. See Mandate for Palestine, supra note 103 art. 25; Rostow, supra note 2, at 156.
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On the one hand, Professor Eugene Rostow, Professor of Law and
Public Affairs at Yale University,"12 argues that the states of Jordan
and Israel already exist in Palestine and only Gaza and the West
Bank remain as unallocated parts of the mandate." 3 As such, they
remain subject to the original mandate, including the right of Jewish
settlement and development in those mandate areas." 4 Rostow bases
his contention on the ruling of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, and its successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)." 5
These rulings have confirmed the status of the mandates, in general,
and of the Palestine mandate in particular, even after the demise of
the League of Nations."
6
In connection with the mandate for German Southwest Africa
(now called Namibia), the ICJ has ruled that a League mandate is a
binding international instrument, having the character of a treaty or
convention, and that the international community is obligated to en-
sure that its terms are fulfilled. 17 The ICJ noted that Article 80 of
the United Nations Charter "presupposes that the rights of States and
peoples shall not lapse automatically on the dissolution of the League
of Nations. It obviously was the intention to safeguard the rights of
states and peoples under all circumstances and in all respects." " 8 Ar-
ticle 25 of the United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council
to make binding decisions with regard to the future of all mandates." 9
In the case of Namibia, the ICJ upheld the Security Council's
ruling that South Africa had abandoned its rights as the mandatory
power. ' 20 Nevertheless, the mandate survived as a trust, based on Ar-
ticle 80 of the Charter.' 2' The Namibia Mandate parallels the Pales-
112. Rostow, supra note 2, at 112.
113. Id. at 159.
114. Id. at 156, 159.
115. Id. at 156-59.
116. See A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 85 n.20; Rostow, supra note 2, at 156.
117. See Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement-Some Underlying Legal
Problems, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 670.
118. Id. at 670 (quoting Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Af-
rica, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 134).
119. Rostow, supra note 2, at 157.
120. Id. (citing SCOR Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 1, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/25 (1971) aff'd G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966)).
121. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 33-36, 39-40; Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 131-38.
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tinian Mandate despite the different manner in which each was
terminated. The ICJ ruled that South Africa had ceased to be the
legitimate mandatory power, and the future of the mandated territory
is to be settled according to mandate principles. 122 In the case of Pal-
estine, Great Britain withdrew from Palestine as the mandatory
power, thereby terminating its administration of the territory.
123
Nevertheless, both the South West Africa Mandate and the Palestine
Mandate survived the termination of the mandate administration as
trusts under Article 80 of the United Nations Charter. 124
Professor Stone, on the other hand, disputes the Rostow "argu-
ment that the territory in question may still be considered unallocated
areas of the mandate."'' 25 Stone argues that, in addition to ruling that
a mandate continues even after the League's demise, the ICJ has also
ruled that the mandatory power, together with the General Assembly,
can modify the status of the mandate. 126 Britain, in concert with the
United Nations, effectively terminated the mandate on May 14,
1948.127 After that date, only the inhabitants of Palestine had any-
thing to say concerning the disposition or status of Palestinian terri-
tory. 128 Israel declared statehood in part of the mandated territory
and invading Arab armies from Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and
Lebanon occupied the rest. 29 Thus, Stone argues, rather then refer-
122. Rostow, supra note 2, at 158. The mandatory power administering the territories
under the mandate was to continue "to administer them for the well-being and development of
the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Man-
dates, until other arrangements have been agreed [upon] between the United Nations and the
respective mandatory Powers [i.e., peaceful international agreements]." Advisory Opinion on
the International Status of Soulth West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 134 (quoting the Resolution of
the League of Nations of Apr. 18, 1946).
123. Rostow, supra note 2, at 158.
124. Id.
125. Slonim, supra note 49, at 4. See also Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 344, 344-47 (1970). Professor Schwebel opines that "[w]here the prior holder of
territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory
in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title." Id. at 346.
126. Slonim, supra note 49, at 4.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also Green, supra note 33, at 47. Professor Green contends that:
With the establishment of Israel, large numbers of Arab inhabitants of the territory
which constitutes that state left, and it would indeed be a new interpretation even of
the right of self-determination to allow such non-residents to participate in any exer-
cise of franchise directed at deciding whether or not a recognized member of the
international society was entitled to continue in existence. Insofar as the Arab in-
habitants of Israel are concerned, they already enjoy . .. the suffrage and equal
political rights with the other inhabitants of Israel. From the point of view of inter-
national law they are Israelis, even though they may be of Arab ethnic origin.
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ring to the West Bank and Gaza as "unallocated areas of the man-
date," the status of these territories should be determined in
accordance with international law principles.
130
Futhermore, Professor Stone posits that as long as the Arab
States do not negotiate peace with Israel, Israel is justified in holding
on to territory acquired in a war of self-defense. 131 According to
Stone, Israel's presence is, at least, as valid as Jordan's. 32 In other
words, Jordan violated international laws and specific United Nations
resolutions when it invaded the West Bank in 1948, whereas Israel
gained control of the area in 1967 as a consequence of a war of self-
defense.1 33 Only the state of Israel arose in former mandatory Pales-
tine and, thus, Israel's claim may in fact be superior to that of
Jordan. 
34
B. Partition and Wars
In 1947, Great Britain withdrew as the mandatory power in Pal-
estine. Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly voted in
favor of the Palestine Partition Resolution. 135 Professor Stone claims
Id. at 47.
130. Slonim, supra note 49, at 4. According to Stone, Security Council Resolution 242
should serve as the vehicle by which Israel and the de facto Palestinian State of Jordan reach
agreement "on a regime accommodating the political, economic, and strategic concerns of
both states, the rights of entry of Jews under the mandate, as well as the entitlement of the
inhabitants under the Camp David Agreements to 'full autonomy.'" J. STONE, supra note 49,
at 122.
131. Slonim, supra note 49, at 4.
132. Id.
133. See Schwebel, supra note 125, at 346-47. Professor Schwebel asserts that "having
regard to the consideration that Israel acted defensively in 1948 and 1967, Israel has better title
in Palestine than do Jordan and Egypt." Id. at 347. See also Zafren, supra note 4, at 27
(quoting The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1977) (statement of Yehuda Zvi Blum, Professor of International Law, Hebrew
University)) [hereinafter cited as Blum III]. Professor Schwebel's assertion "that Israel can
show better title than Jordan or Egypt to any territory that lives [sic] within the boundaries of
the former Palestinian mandate rests on solid legal foundations." Id. at 27. Furthermore,
"[t]itle to territory is normally based not on a claim of absolute validity-few such claims
could be substantiated, not even those of the United States of America to the territory which it
holds-but rather on one of relative validity." Id. at 27. Thus, the relative superiority of
Israel's claim under international law cannot be equalled. Id. at 27A.
134. Slonim, supra note 49, at 3.
135. G.A. Res. 181 II, U.N. GAOR 131-32 (1947). See also Slonim, supra note 49, at 2.
According to Slonim's interpretation of Stone, the Arabs steadfastly maintain the illegality of
the Resolution, thus not only delegitimizing Israel, but also justifying the Arab invasion in
1948. At the same time, they wish to bind Israel to certain features of the Plan and to impart a
mandatory quality to post-1967 resolutions regarding Palestine. Id.; A. GERSON, supra note
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that the United Nations is empowered under Article 10 of the Charter
to adopt the Partition Resolution. 136 However, since the General As-
sembly is limited to making recommendations, the resolution was not
binding and, therefore, could not vest rights in the Arabs or the
Jews.' 37 The resolution would bind parties only to the extent they
wished to be bound. As a result, the partition plan was aborted be-
cause no agreement was reached.
38
By contrast, Professor Rostow, citing the ICJ's 1950 advisory
opinion regarding Namibia, 139 argues that the Partition Resolution
was valid and binding when adopted because the mandatory power,
together with the General Assembly, could modify the mandate's
terms.140 In fact, Britain and the General Assembly did modify the
mandate in 1947 when the General Assembly adopted the Partition
Resolution. '4'
However, Israel's existence as a sovereign state under either in-
terpretation does not derive from the Partition Resolution because,
regardless of the original binding nature of the Resolution when
adopted, it ceased to obligate the parties concerned when the Arabs
violently rejected the resolution in May of 1948 by declaring invalid
the newly declared state of Israel.142 The Resolution could not bind
99, at 49. According to Gerson, partition was the best option to reconcile Jewish and Arab
national interests without war and without continued supervision of the Mandate. Id.
136. See Slonim, supra note 49, at 2.
137. Id. See also Zafren, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Professor Alah Hulatapa of Cam-
bridge University) (" '[R]esolutions of the General Assembly do not normally create legal obli-
gations for the members of the [United Nations]. . . and the partition resolution did not have
a legislative character.' ").
138. Slonim, supra note 49, at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. Slonim notes that "in the matter of mandates the Assembly was empowered to
act in conjunction with the mandatory power (Great Britain) to modify the terms of the man-
date." Id. at 2.
141. Id.
142. The League of Arab States, in a cablegram to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 938-44, argued that the
"Mandate... was illegal," the "Partition plan was a nullity," the "inchoate sovereignty of
the Palestinian people in the territory had to be" achieved upon Great Britain's withdrawal
from Palestine, and "the establishment of Israel [constituted] 'an armed attack' on the territo-
rial integrity and political independence of the emerging state of Palestine, which the people of
Palestine and their neighbors had a right to resist. . . according to Article 51 of the Charter."
Rostow, supra note 2, at 163 n.41. See also PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER, arts. 19, 29,
reprinted in CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 449-50; cf Slonim, supra note 49, at 2.
Slonim asserts that Professors Feinberg and Stone have effectively rebutted the Arab position.
"Israel's statehood, like that of any other state, is premised on thefact of its being-and not on
any external factor ...... Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). See also Green, supra note 33, at
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one party only.1 43 Stone argues that since the United Nations re-
mained silent in the face of Arab belligerency, Israel could no longer
be bound to the Partition Resolution.'" Hence, according to Stone,
the partition plan was a moot issue. 45 In the face of the Arabs' com-
mitment to a single Arab state in all of Palestine, war became
inevitable. 
46
The war of 1948-49 culminated in armistice agreements between
Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria on the
other.' 47 The wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, and the 1969-70 War of At-
trition followed.1 48 Under Article III of the Egyptian-Israeli Armi-
stice Agreement, following the 1948-49 War, Egypt committed itself
57 ("The state of Israel was born, as so many other states have been born, by the recognition of
the existing states of the world, no more difficult, no more simple than that."). Professor
Green argues that:
[W]hatever may be the view today of the rights or wrongs of the Jewish National
Home as envisaged by the Mandate, it cannot be ignored that, in the first place,
historical ex post reasoning has little significance in the eyes of the law. If it did,
interesting problems might arise in connection with every state which has been estab-
lished by immigrants and of which the descendants of the aboriginal population are
now claiming reversionary rights as "the original people." Moreover, the Mandate
and its purpose were recognized by the Members of the League of Nations and such
non-Members as the United States, that is to say, the bulk of those who made up
international society at the time and whose practice has always been viewed as either
creating, or as evidence, of international law. The fact that what has been created in
this way may now be open to criticism by some or even be generally unpopular,
would not in any way alter the legal validity of the situation thus created ....
Id. Professor Green further argues that since then the United Nations has itself played a part
in the legal evolution of the territory with its Partition Resolution, the establishment of Israel
and its admission to the United Nations which meant recognition of the state by all Members.
Id.
143. Slonim, supra note 49, at 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 49.
147. General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt, 1 Kitve' Amanah (Israel)
3, 42 U.N.T.S. 251; General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, Israel-Lebanon, 1 Kitve'
Amanah (Israel) 23, 42 U.N.T.S. 287; General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Israel-
Jordan, 1 Kitve' Amanah (Israel) 49, 42 U.N.T.S. 327; General Armistice Agreement, July 20,
1949, Israel-Syria, 1 Kitve' Amanah (Israel) 37, 42 U.N.T.S. 303.
148. Rostow, supra note 2, at 164. See also CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 217-
18:
Responding to alleged Egyptian provocations, Israel in October, 1956, after a light-
ning victory, occupied the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt. The 1949 Armistice
Agreement was, however, reinstated when arrangements were made early in 1957 to
evacuate Israeli troops and to introduce a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
into the area in order to secure tranquility on the Egypt-Israeli border and freedom
of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The withdrawal of UNEF
ten years later, in connection with increased military and political tensions, led to the
1967 Six Days War and the suspension of the 1949 Armistice Agreements between
the Arab states and Israel. Cease fire arrangements were set up by the U.N. and the
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to withdraw its armed forces to the west of the Egyptian-Palestinian
border. 149 Gaza was retained within Palestine. 150 However, Egypt vi-
olated the 1949 Armistice Agreement by occupying Gaza until dis-
placed by Israel in 1967.151 Egypt was, therefore, a belligerent
occupant in violation of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, as
well as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which proscribes
the use of force in international relations.
52
Jordan, by forcibly and unlawfully occupying the West Bank
during the 1948-49 War and remaining there, violated Article 2(2) of
the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement of 1949.153 The purpose of
the Agreement was to freeze the legal situation present at the time,
pending the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries. 54
Jordan's subsequent annexation of that territory was, therefore, le-
gally invalid: 5 5 "[t]erritorial change cannot properly take place as a
result of the unlawful use of force."' 56
C. United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338
The 1967 War was followed by U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 242.157 The resolution called not only for peace, but also for an
end to all claims on the part of the Arabs that a state of belligerence
existed between Israel and its neighbors. 158 Further, Israel would be
antagonists after Israel captured the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank
and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.
[T]he 1967 ceasefire has not produced a peaceful settlement. . . . The Arabs
view [Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza] as a classical illustration of Zion-
ism's 'expansionism' and 'imperialism.' Israel, on the other hand, insists that it is
entitled to determine what are her vital security interests, and therefore, it intends to
never return to the pre-Six-Days War frontiers.
149. Brinton, Israel: What is Occupied Territory? A Reply to the Legal Advisor, 2 HARV.




153. Art. 2(2) provides that "[n]o provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice
the rights, claims and positions of either Party. . . ; the provisions of this Agreement being
dictated exclusively by military considerations." General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949,
Israel-Jordan, 1 Kitve' Amanah (Israel) 37, 42 U.N.T.S. 327. See also Zafren, supra note 4, at
24-25.
154. Brinton, supra note 149, at 211. See also Zafren, supra note 4, at 24.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Anglo-Israel Association
Pamphlet No. 19 (1968)) (emphasis in original).





under no obligation to withdraw from any occupied territories until
the Arab States concerned made peace.' 59 Additionally, the resolu-
tion provided that Israel should withdraw to "secure and recognized
boundaries" to be reached by agreement. 160 Considerations of secur-
ity, guarantees of maritime rights through all the international water-
ways, and the respective legal claims of the parties to the territory in
question were among the issues to be negotiated. 16 1 However, the
Arab States responded to Resolution 242 with the three "noes" of
Khartoum.162
The 1973 War resulted in Security Council Resolution 338,163
which ordered the nations involved in the dispute to negotiate "imme-
diately and concurrently with [a] cease fire" the establishment of a
"just and durable peace" in accordance with Security Council Resolu-
tion 242 "in all its parts."'164 Resolution 338 is the strongest in a long
series of resolutions calling upon or ordering the Arab nations to ne-
gotiate peace with Israel. 165 Hence, Resolution 338, according to Pro-
fessor Rostow, has the legal effect of definitively rejecting the Arab
and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) thesis that the existence




161. Id. See Rostow, supra note 2, at 165-66.
162. Arab Heads of State affirmed the "main principles by which the Arab States abide,
namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, [and] no negotiations with it, and insis-
tence on the rights of the Palestinians in their own country." Arab Summit Conference on
Khartoum, 29 Aug. to 1 Sept. 1967, reprinted in CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105. at 428.
See also THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 1082; Bassiouni I, supra note 12, at
35 (Professor Bassiouni objects that in Resolution 242, the Palestinian people were only re-
ferred to in one sentence, which characterized them as "refugees" without recognizing the
Palestinian people as a fact).
163. S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (1973), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIAL 1470 (1978).
164. Id.
165. Rostow, supra note 2, at 166-67. Recent history has witnessed the signing of the
Camp David Peace Agreements between Israel and Egypt which provide for the establishment
of peace between Israel and Egypt and requires negotiations to establish "autonomy" in the
West Bank and Gaza. Id. at 167; see Comment, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1466 (1978), and Framework for the Conclusion of A Peace Treaty
Between Egypt and Israel, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 1470 (1978) (Camp David
Agreements).
166. Rostow, supra note 2, at 167.
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D. The Validity of Israel's Presence on the West Bank under
International Law
During the 1967 War,167 Israel took control of certain areas,
among them the West Bank. 168 Subsequently, Israel established set-
tlements there. The United States, the United Nations, and others
have opined that the Israeli settlements on the West Bank contravene
international law. 169 For example, in 1978, the Legal Advisor to the
State Department viewed Israel's presence on the West Bank as that
of a belligerent occupant under the Hague and Geneva Conven-
tions.170 The State Department argued that Article 49 of the Geneva
Convention of 1949' 71 prohibits a state, administering the territory of
another state as a belligerent occupant, from displacing the inhabit-
ants of the territory and establishing its own citizens in their place,
unless necessitated by security or governmental requirements. 7 2 Spe-
cifically, Article 49 provides that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the terri-
tory it occupies."' 1
73
The Israel is, on the other hand, maintain that the settlements are
legal. 174 The Israelis contend that even if the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion applies to Israel's presence on the West Bank, Article 49 would
not cover the settlements.' 75 They argue that Article 49 bans forcible
167. See Bassiouni, "The Middle East:" The Misunderstood Conflict, in THE ARAB-IS-
RAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 327 [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni II]. Bassiouni notes
that:
Israel claims that Egypt's closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, its request for withdrawal of
the UNEF forces from the Sinai, and the massing of 60,000 to 80,000 men on that
border constituted with respect to the closing of the Gulf a casus belli and with re-
spect to the troops' movement coupled with public speeches made by political leaders
an imminent threat of "armed attack" that justified its preventive strike act of self-
defense.
Id. at 349; see Hargrove, Abating the Middle East Crisis Through the United Nations (and Vice
Versa), in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 361, 362.
168. See S. AVERICK & S. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 1 (The Arabs refer to the area as
"occupied territories"; Israelis refer to them as "administered territories.").
169. See Zafren, supra note 4, at 3.
170. Comment, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 777-79 (1978). This opinion was signed by
H. Hansell, Legal Advisor, Department of State; see also 126 CONG. REC. H2342-43 (daily ed.
Mar. 28, 1980) (statement of Sec. of State Cyrus R. Vance).
171. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention states that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Geneva
Convention of 1949, art. 49.
172. Rostow, supra note 2, at 159-60.
173. Geneva Convention of 1949, art. 49.
174. See Zafren, supra note 4, at 21.
175. Blum III, supra note 133, at 25 (emphasis in original).
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transfers, not voluntary acts of individuals taking up residence in the
areas under consideration.176 The Fourth Geneva Convention was
drafted at a time when the prohibited activity envisaged was "individ-
ual or mass forcible transfer of population,"'' 77 such as those carried
out by Nazi Germany in occupied territories in order to make room
for the settlement of Germans in those areas. 78 The Israelis contend,
however, that the establishment of the West Bank settlements does
not result in the expulsion of the local population from its homes and
land. 179 Thus, it is argued, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention does
not apply here. 180
Furthermore, Professor Yehuda Blum, a recognized interna-
tional law expert and former Israeli Ambassador to the United Na-
tions, argues that Israel cannot be considered an occupying power
under international law, because the terms "occupying power" and
"occupied territory" are terms of art and have a specific meaning in
international law.' 8 1 The terms refer to a situation in which one state
seizes control of the sovereign territory of another as a result of hostil-
ities between the two.' 82 The state which controls the territory thus
becomes the occupying power and assumes the rights and obligations
176. Blum II, supra note 101.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Middle East Strategic Problems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1977) (statement of Rita E. Hauser, Esq.). Hauser argues that "the relevant issue is
whether or not the local population has been displaced in the course of establishing the settle-
ment." Id. at 49.
180. See id. See also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW TREATISE 452 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed. 7th ed.). According to the Oppenheim Treatise, article 49 was intended to prohibit a
transfer of the occupier's nationals "for the purpose of displacing the population of the occu-
pied territory." Id. See also Gerson, 72 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 131, 134 (1978). Gerson
agrees with Israel's position concerning the applicability of the Geneva Convention. Gerson
notes that "serious questions arise regarding the legal applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tion. . . .However, assuming in the alternative that the Geneva Convention is dejure applica-
ble, it remains, at best, questionable whether Israel's settlement activity, to the extent that it
has continued to date, can be deemed unlawful." Id. See also Blum II, supra note 101. Ac-
cording to Professor Blum, Israel, although not required to do so by the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, goes beyond the requirements of its principles. Id. For example, Israel provides
access for the local population to Israel's courts, facilitates movement of the local population
in both directions, including to Arab countries who consider themselves at war with Israel,
and has never applied the death penalty, despite egregious crimes in the territories. Id. But see
CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 132 (the Arab states charge that "Israel intimidates
and terrorizes the Arab population on the West Bank and Gaza by the imposition of curfews.
demolitions of houses, arrests and expulsions.").
181. Blum III, supra note 133, at 26.
182. Id.
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inherent in that status. s3
The West Bank case differs from the traditional notion of the
belligerent occupant, because the West Bank is not the sovereign terri-
tory of Jordan. 18 4 Jordan's seizure of the area in 1948, in defiance of
the Partition Plan and in violation of the Jordan-Israel Armistice
Agreement, has not been internationally recognized. 18 5 For example,
only two countries recognized this extension of Jordan's territory,
Britain and Pakistan. 8 6 Moreover, the Arab States have never recog-
nized Jordan's claims. 8 7 According to Professor Blum, the rules pro-
tecting the reversionary rights of a legitimate sovereign do not apply
when no such sovereign exists.188 Professor Blum concludes that:
The legal standing of Israel in the territories in question is
thus that of a State which is lawfully in control of territory in re-
183. Id.
184. Rostow, note 2, at 160. "[N]either Jordan on the West Bank nor Egypt in the Gaza
Strip could claim, after 1967, that its prior administration was that of the legitimate sovereign
whose rights were temporarily displaced by the fortunes of war .... " See Blum, The Missing
Reversioner, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279, 279 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Blum IV] (As Professor
Blum notes, "the reversioner was missing.").
185. Blum IV, supra note 184, at 289.
186. Id. at 290. See also Miller, Focus: Overdue Correction, Jewish Week, Dec. 27, 1985,
at 4, col. 1. Dr. Lewis M. Alexander, director of the State Department's Office of the Geogra-
pher, "conceded... that only Britain and Pakistan had ever acknowledged Jordanian sover-
eignty over the so-called West Bank. Indeed the United States had not endorsed Jordan's 1948
invasion of the area which had been counter to the United Nations 1947 plan for partition of
Palestine." Id.; see also A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 235. According to Gerson, "Jordan
itself acknowledged that its administration of the area was without prejudice to the ultimate
settlement of the Palestinian problem." Id.
187. Blum IV, supra note 184, at 290-91.
188. Id. at 294. See also Blum III, supra note 133, at 26. Professor Blum argues that
sovereignty over such areas is not transferred by one state to another as a result of the change
of physical control over them. The legitimate sovereign, i.e., "the state whose forces have been
driven out of the occupied territory, retains its sovereignty over this territory even after its
physical removal from [the territory] and annexation of such occupied territory by the occu-
pant is absolutely prohibited." Id. Thus, the rights of the sovereign are protected from the
occupant. Id. However, according to Professor Blum, the circumstances envisaged by the
Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply to the West Bank and Gaza because the situation
there is not one of an occupying power confronting a legitimate sovereign. Id. See also Rad-
ley, supra note 87, at 597-98. According to Radley:
[T]he traditional rules of international law governing belligerent occupation were
grounded in the assumption that it was the legitimate sovereign that was ousted from
the territory in question. Since neither Palestinian Jews nor Palestinian Arabs had,
prior to the conflict itself, established a sovereign presence in the disputed territory,
the question whether the legitimate sovereign was ousted is not here even
reached. . . . The obstacle to adapting the notion of belligerent recognition to Pales-




spect of which no other States can show better title. Or if it is
preferred to state the matter in terms of belligerent occupant, than
the legal standing of Israel in the territories in question is at the
very least that of a belligerent occupant of territory in respect of
which Jordan is not entitled to the reversionary rights of a legiti-
mate sovereign. '
89
As Professor Blum notes, title to territory is based on a claim of rela-
tive validity, rather than absolute validity. Thus, since Israel's claim
is unequalled, "this relative superiority of Israel['s claim] may be suffi-
cient, under international law, to make possession of Judea and Sama-
ria virtually indistinguishable from an absolute title, to be valid "ergo
omnes." 190 Therefore, Israel is not subject to international law limita-
tions imposed on a belligerent occupant. 191 Noted author Allan Ger-
son advocates a new standard of military occupancy, "trustee-
occupant;" that is, a status greater than a belligerent occupant, but
less than a legitimate sovereign. 192 According to Gerson, "[tihe occu-
pying power would, insofar as not directly injurious to his security,
permit and further the development of autonomous institutions."'' 93
Thus, he characterizes Jordan's legal status before the 1967 War in
this manner and suggests its applicability for Israel's legal status to-
day vis-a-vis the West Bank. 194 Israel, however, has not assumed this
role. 195 Instead it continues to comply defacto with the Geneva Con-
vention while leaving open the question of its de jure application.1 96
The Hague and Geneva Conventions view belligerent occupation
as temporary, to be followed by the ending of the state of war and the
beginning of peace negotiations. 19 7 The provisions of the Conventions
thus shielded the inhabitants from the frequent radical changes in
their lives as a result of territory changing hands after battle.198 How-
ever, although a state of war may persist, eighteen years have passed
since the last battle for possession of the West Bank. 199 According to
189. Blum IV, supra note 184, at 294 (emphasis in original).
190. Id. at 294-95 n.60. The term "ergo" is defined as "therefore" and the term "omne'" is
defined as "anyone." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 414, 884 (3d ed. 1969).
191. Zafren, supra note 4, at 23 (quoting Blum III, supra note 133).
192. A. GERSON, supra note 99, at 78-79; see also Zafren, supra note 4, at 31.
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Professor William O'Brien, author and international law scholar, the
passage of time has taken the West Bank situation out of the normal
time frame of "belligerent occupancy" because there is currently no
shooting war that would change the status of the West Bank.2°° Fur-
thermore, the Arab States, with the exception of Egypt, refuse to ne-
gotiate peace with Israel.2 0 1 Thus, O'Brien contends, it is legally
questionable to characterize the Israeli occupation as that of a normal
wartime belligerent requiring the full application of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions.
20 2
Moreover, the United States position, that the settlements con-
travene international law, has been eroded by the development of in-
ternational law since 1967 in connection with Namibia and the Camp
David Agreements. 20 3 The ICJ, in its decision regarding Namibia,
has opined that the League Mandate is a binding international instru-
ment, 2° and that Article 25 authorizes the Security Council to make
binding decisions with regard to the future of the remaining man-
dates.20 5 Therefore, the West Bank may be viewed as an integral part
of the Palestine Mandate in which a Jewish national home was to be
established; the territory "must be considered today to be unallocated
territory;" 20 6 and the future of the West Bank and Gaza must be "ar-
ranged by peaceful international agreement in ways which fulfill the
policies of the Mandate. '20 7
Furthermore, the State Department Legal Advisor's opinion,
concluding that the settlements are against international law, has been
criticized by legal scholars 20 for a lack of objective analysis. 20 9 Wil-
liam Brinton, an international lawyer, asserts that the Legal Advisor
to the State Department plays a partisan role in favor of the Arabs.210
According to Brinton, the State Department is not the




203. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
204. See Rostow, supra note 2, at 155.
205. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
206. See O'Brien, supra note 197.
207. Rostow, supra note 2, at 159.
208. See generally Brinton, supra note 149; A. GERSON, supra note 99; Gerson, supra note
180.
209. Zafren, supra note 4, at 28 (quoting Gerson, supra note 180, at 137). For the admin-
istration "to condemn, while acting as mediator, one party's conduct as unlawful, when the
legality of such conduct is debatable, is to engage in the politics of confrontation." Id.
210. See Brinton, supra note 149, at 207-14.
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law. Yet the public and the press often attach mythical propor-
tions to the State Department announcements about international
law, treating them as objectively determinable fact and as fully dis-
positive of the issue. Thus. . . foreign policy decision-making can
be easily cloaked from the public eye by facile unsubstantiated as-
sertions of international law.
211
On the one hand, the United States supports the proposition that
Israel is a "belligerent occupant" and its settlements are illegal.
21 2
The United States contends that the settlements are neither "intended
to be of limited duration nor. . . appear to be required to meet mili-
tary needs during the occupation." 21 3 Israel, on the other hand, ar-
gues that it has "as good a legal title to the area as any other
contending nation .... -214 Hence, Israel is not subject to any of
the limitations international law imposes on a belligerent occupant.
215
Despite a majority view and official expressions by most nations that
the settlements are illegal, from a strictly legal perspective the issue of
the legality of the settlements has not been resolved.
21 6
IV. EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE FUTURE OF
THE PALESTINIAN ARABS
A. Evolution of the Settlements
A familiarity with the evolution of the Israeli settlements on the
West Bank is helpful to appreciate the conflicting views regarding the
effects of those settlements on the future of the Palestinian Arabs liv-
ing in those areas.
211. Zafren, supra note 4, at 29. Zafren notes that Brinton has specifically criticized the
State Department Legal Advisor's opinion as incorrect. Id. at 29-30. According to Brinton,
for the Legal Advisor to state that " '[d]uring the June, 1967 war, Israeli forces occupied Gaza,
the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights,' . . . is a conclusory state-
ment. ... Brinton, supra note 149, at 212 (quoting an opinion of the State Department
Legal Advisor) (emphasis in original). The Legal Advisor offers no rational basis for this
assertion. Id. Rather, "Israel has a rational, legally sound basis for stating that it is not obli-
gated to withdraw from the West Bank since Israel did not occupy the West Bank during the
1967 War. Id. at 214. Both Jordan and Egypt were unlawful aggressor occupants and were
displaced by Israel. Id.
212. Zafren, supra note 4, at 34.
213. Id. (quoting letter from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Donald M. Fraser, Chairman of House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Lee
H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 17 INT'L
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Israeli settlement in occupied territories can be divided into three
phases.217 Initially, Israeli settlement adhered to the unofficial "Allon
Plan, ' 218 which embodied strategic and political concerns. 21 9 One
commentator has said that Allon's goal was that:
[T]he permanent borders of Israel must be defensible from a strate-
gic point of view and must depend on permanent topographical
obstacles that can withstand the onslaught of modern land armies
and lend themselves to large-scale retaliatory attacks. Such secur-
ity borders must ...be political borders; the border would be
political only if Jewish settlement existed along its length.
220
Although the plan's stated purpose was to obtain "secure and recog-
nized borders, '221 the plan essentially precluded the establishment of
a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank.222 Rather, the Allon
Plan contemplated a form of union with Jordan. 223 Thus, between
1967-77, approximately twenty-four settlements were established on
the West Bank by Israel under a Labor Party administration.
224
The second phase of the Israeli settlement process was temporar-
ily halted by the trauma of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the subse-
quent negotiations with Syria and Egypt, and the internal Israeli
political upheaval. 225 The settlement process, however, received new
impetus from the Gush Emunim, a movement founded in 1974, which
advocated the creation of a "Greater Israel" in "Judea and Sama-
217. See M. BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S
POLICIES 51 (1984). See also Friedman, Report Puts Total of West Bank Settlers at 42,500,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, at 17, col. 1. ("Mr. Benvenisti's West Bank Data Project has been
considered, by many proponents and opponents of Jewish settlement on the 'West Bank,' to be
one of the most authoritative sources of demographics in the region.").
218. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 51-52. See Olmert, in Prophets of the Holy Land,
HARPER'S, Dec. 1984, at 33, 46. According to Olmert, the Allon Plan, articulated in 1967 by
Yigal Allon, then Foreign Minister of Israel, was the official policy of the Israeli government
from 1967-77. Id. at 46. The plan envisaged "territorial compromise" in the West Bank and
Gaza wherein "Israel would withdrew from the heavily populated parts of the West Bank,
retaining military installations only in strategic positions along the Jordan River." Id.
219. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 51; see O'Brien in Prophets of the Holy Land,
HARPER'S, Dec. 1984, at 33, 42. According to O'Brien, under the Allon Plan, "Israel would
keep Jerusalem as its united capital, retain its line of defenses and Jewish settlements along the
western bank of the river Jordan, and reserve the right of military access across the territory of
the 'West Bank.'" Id.
220. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 51.
221. Gendzier, Settlements Deeply Implanted, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 1978, at 201.
222. Kaufmann, Israel's Flexible Voters, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1985-86, at 109, 110.
223. Id.
224. Id.




ria. '226 The Gush Emunim Plan called for a dense chain of approxi-
mately sixty settlements, thus providing a defensive wall to a possible
strong, united Arab Eastern front, and to effectively preclude the de-
velopment of another Arab state in that area.
227
With the advent of a new Likud government in 1977, Labor's
"bureaucratic-strategic" approach to West Bank settlement, as out-
lined in the Allon Plan, was replaced with the "ideological-strategic"
approach of the Gush Emunim, whose objective is settlement in all
parts of "Greater Israel. ' 221 Likud's policy emphasized the right of
Jews to settle and control all of the historical land of Israel, 229 and,
therefore, followed comprehensive regionwide land use planning.
230
The Likud thus reasoned that only by "creating facts" (i.e., per-
manent settlements and other economic and social factors) could
Israel's security be guaranteed and the possibility of a Palestinian
State precluded. 231  Forty-four settlements were established under
Likud's first government, 232 and under a second Likud government,
elected in June, 1981, the "settlement program intensified.
'233
However, a chain of events, from 1981-84, including the Lebanon
War, the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Prime Minister Begin's resig-
nation in 1983, the deteriorating economy and the galloping inflation
rate deeply affected Israeli public opinion, 234 resulting in a weakening
of support for West Bank policies. 235 Factors underlying the view
that territorial compromise is not possible include: the drift to the
right of Israeli politics; 236 the strong support given to Likud by Se-
phardic Jews, Israel's fastest growing population group; and the
suburbanizing trend which draws strength from low apartment prices
and economic incentives from the government. 237 Thus, the third
226. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 52. "Judea" and "Samaria" are the Biblical terms
used by Israel to describe the West Bank. Id. at 52. See supra note 3.
227. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 52.
228. Kaufmann, supra note 222, at 111.
229. Id.
230. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 26-27.
231. Kaufmann, supra note 222, at I11.
232. Id. at 112.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 113.
235. Id. at 114.
236. Id. at 115.
237. M. BENVINISTI, supra note 217, at 64-65. See also Temko, West Bank's Changing
Face, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 18, 1985, at 9, col. I (asserting that the "new breed of
West Bank settlers [is] doing more in their quiet way to deter the future of the disputed terri-
tory than the first, ideologically motivated wave of Jews .... ").
1986]
584 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 8:551
phase of Israeli settlement changed the focus of settlement activity
from subsidized rural villages to settlement in metropolitan areas.
Consequently, Israel, in the early 1980's, entered the "suburban
era."'238 According to Meron Benvenisti, Israeli urbanologist and for-
mer Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, "the typical settler of the 1980's
is a figure well-known throughout the Western World: the
suburbanite. 2
39
B. The Future of the Settlements
In his recent population study, produced by the West Bank Data
Project, 240 Benvenisti concludes that the de facto annexation of the
West Bank and Gaza has passed the "critical point" of no return and
is now irreversible. 24' Thus, on the one hand, Benvenisti, a critic of
Jewish settlement activities, contends that the socio-economic and
demographic situation and other "facts" created by Israel on the West
Bank preclude any sovereignty other than Israel's in those territo-
ries.2 42 He argues that the government has gained absolute control
over fifty-two percent of the West Bank land,243 and predicts that the
Jewish settlers which currently number 42,50024- will reach 100,000
238. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 57 (asserting that by 1983, 106 settlements had
been established in the West Bank and Gaza).
Israeli settlements are officially grouped in two broad categories: . . . urban-subur-
ban and rural-semiurban. Urban settlements include the following types:
1. The city[,] . ..a strong urban community serving as regional, industrial, serv-
ices and cultural center. Its population consists of more than 10,000 families ....
2. The. . .town[,] .. .an urban center of 3,000-5,000 families . . . and a subre-
gional service center, with low-density housing ...
3. The . . .suburb[,] .. .a satellite neighborhood serving as a commuter dormi-
tory with minimum local services but with good access to major metropolitan areas
[consisting of 500-2,000 families] ...
Rural-semiurban settlements include .
1. The. . . non-agricultural cooperative settlement .. which provides infrastruc-
ture, housing, and basic industry . . . .Employment is mainly outside the settle-
ment . . . . 'Clusters' of [these cooperative settlements] are planned to form a
[town]. The planned population size is 200-300 families. . . .This cooperative set-
tlement is affiliated with the Gush Emunim settlement movement.
3. The settlement center . . . is an undefined housing estate planned to form the
nucleus of a settlement. When sufficient settlers are gathered, they decide on the type
of permanent settlement.
Id. at 49-50. See supra text and accompanying notes 226-27.
239. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 64.
240. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217 and accompanying text.
241. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 69.
242. Id. at 30-35.
243. Id.
244. See Friedman, supra note 217, at 17 ("the number of settlers [on the 'West Bank'] has
not exceeded 53,000").
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by the end of the decade. 245 Therefore, Benvenisti concludes that
although theoretically the process of defacto annexation might be re-
versible, "a realistic estimate of the forces at work for annexation as
against those that oppose it invites the conclusion that for the foresee-
able future all of Palestine will be ruled by an Israeli government."
246
On the other hand, not all commentators agree with Benvenisti's
conclusion that the annexation is irreversible. 247 Yadin Kaufmann,
an Israeli Supreme Court law clerk with degrees in law and Middle
Eastern studies from Harvard University, asserts
that the 'irreversibility' theory [to the extent it] relies on such mea-
surements as the number of settlements or settlers, the relative
strengths of political parties and growing support for the policies of
the right-wing Likud coalition by Israelis of North Africa and
Asian descent, . . . overstates the extent and tenacity for support
for annexation.
24 8
Moreover, Kaufmann indicates that, at least from the standpoint of
the Israeli public, territorial compromise249 on the West Bank remains
a viable policy option.250 He posits that the "irreversibility theory
fails to account for the War in Lebanon and the deepening economic
crisis," in which an important shift in Israel's attitude has oc-
curred. 25' These developments "have shaken .. the beliefs that the
245. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 60.
246. Id.
247. Eban, in Prophets of the Holy Land, HARPER'S, Dec. 1984, at 33, 39. Abba Eban,
former Foreign Minister of Israel and chairman of the Knesset's Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee, does not accept the theory of "irreversibility," that is, the "irreversible process of
integration arising from the settlements already established in the heart of Arab-populated
areas. ... Id. at 38-39. Eban asserts that "the attempt to deny the Arab character of the
West Bank and Gaza by demographic and other changes has failed. A territorial compromise
leading to demilitarized territories under Arab rule is not only feasible but inevitable." Id. at
39. Furthermore, optimal conditions for increased settlements no longer exist because of fi-
nancial constraints and a "visible disquiet on the question of more settlements." Id.; see also
Magarik, Giving Up Too Soon: The West Bank's Future, JEWISH CURRENTS, May 1985, at 7.
According to Magarik, although there is no doubt that Israel intends to annex the West Bank:
"Benvenisti does not prove that this annexationist process is factually irreversible." Id. at 8
(emphasis in original); see also Gendzier, supra note 221, at 204. Gendzier argues that "with-
drawal is not impossible-other nations have surrendered their colonies-but for it to occur in
this case would require a profound political change in Israel." Id.
248. Kaufmann, supra note 222, at 109-10.
249. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
250. Kaufman, supra note 222, at 118.
251. Id. According to Kaufmann, prior to the Lebanon War, the percentage of Israelis
opposing any territorial compromise ranged from 47% to 58%. However, during and after the
Lebanon War, this figure dropped to 40%. Id.
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land belongs to Israel for religious and strategic reasons. 252
While opponents to territorial compromise argue that retaining
the territories not only ensures peace and Israel's survival, but also
prevents the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank
and Gaza, 253 proponents of territorial compromise, that is, relinquish-
ing part of the West Bank in exchange for a peace agreement with
Jordan, 254 argue that by destroying the military and political infra-
structure of the PLO,255 the Lebanon War made the possibility of a
Palestinian State more remote. 256 Furthermore, the high cost in lives
led many Israelis to question the utility of using force to settle the
Arab-Israeli conflict. 257 Therefore, it is argued that the settlement
process on the West Bank is not irreversible.
258
C. The Israeli Government View
The Armistice Agreements of 1949 did not "determine legally
settled and recognized boundaries between Israel and its Arab neigh-
bors. 12 59 According to the Israeli government, its administration of
territories occupied in the Six Days War accords with international
law and Israel has consistently maintained that secure and recognized
borders are a prerequisite to withdrawal. 260 However, Israeli insists it
will never return to pre-1967 borders because of vital security inter-
ests.261 Thus, the occupation has acquired permanent characteris-
tics.262 The Arabs, however, view Israel's determination to continue
the occupation as "expansionism.
'263
The Likud Party stand on the status and future of the Israeli
252. Id. at 110.
253. Id. at 123.
254. Id. at 112.
255. An organization committed to the destruction of the State of Israel. See Ajami, in
Prophets of the Holy Land, HARPER'S, Dec. 1984, at 33, 34. Ajami, Director of Middle East-
ern Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, asserts
that "[tioday Arafat and his lieutenants banished from the power and corruption of Beirut and
southern Lebanon. . . . have lost their final possession-a border with an enemy they could
see and hope to fight. Their political venture has ended in the banal isolation of a Tunis hotel."
Id.
256. Kaufmann, supra note 222, at 123.
257. Id. at 123.
258. Id. at 117-20.
259. CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 228.
260. Id. at 235.
261. Id. at 218.
262. Id.
263. See Hadawi, Israeli Expansionism, in CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 219,
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settlements is that "[tihe right to settle in all parts of the land of Israel
(Mandatory Palestine) [is] . . . axiomatic and non-negotiable."264
Even Labor Party leaders maintain that "Jewish settlements should
remain under Israeli control. ' 265 Furthermore, Benvenisti asserts
that the "[s]ettlements, military presence, and ultimate jurisdiction
were meant to be permanent. ,266
Moreover, William O'Brien asserts that the settlements do not
constitute "an unnatural intrusion of people with no roots in the
area. ' 267 Generally, Judea and Samaria are "considered homeland by
the Jews and there are good reasons for them to settle" in the West
Bank.268  For example, many Jews have direct family relationships
with locations in the area,269 such as the Etzion Bloc of settlements
which is comprised of the children and grandchildren of Jews killed
or displaced by the Arabs in the 1948 War.270 Many areas, such as
Hebron, had and continue to have profound religious and historical
significance to Jews. 271 Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the settle-
ments on the West Bank are, for the most part, "located in uninhab-
ited or sparsely populated regions. '272 Israel has acquired land in the
territories for settlements through direct seizure (i.e., declaring land
to be State Land or by seizing land for military purposes), by
purchase, and by expropriation of ownerless property or private prop-
erty owned by absentee landlords. 273 When owners could be located,
they were given the choice of cash compensation or alternative land,
264. M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 39.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 39.





272. MYTHS AND FACTS, supra note 79, at 67-68. Nearly all the settlements "have been
placed along the sparsely inhabited Jordan Valley or along the 'green line,' the pre-1967 armi-
stice lines-a further indication of the defense-oriented nature of many of the settlements." Id.
273. O'Brien, supra note 197. Benvenisti contends that the "[tihe legal basis quoted by the
Israelis is Article 52 of the Hague regulations, which reads: 'Requisitions in kind and services
shall not be demanded from local authorities or inhabitants except for the need of the army of
occupation.'" M. BENVENISTI, supra note 217, at 31 (emphasis in original). According to
Benvenisti, "[r]equisition 'for military purposes' has been the method used until 1980 to secure
land for Israeli settlements." Id. After Likud came to power, the requisition method was no
longer used. Rather "national security needs in the broad sense" was the raison d'etre for land
acquisition as approved as "immediate and urgent military needs." Id. Furthermore, after the
Elon Moreh decision of the Israel High Court of Justice, see infra note 274, the Likud seized
land by declaring it "State Land." Id. at 31-32.
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and any owner who is dissatisfied with the compensation or proce-
dures of acquisition has the right of access to the Supreme Court of
Israel.274 Therefore, the manner in which the lands for settlement
have been acquired is neither violative of international law, of human
rights, nor affects the rights or the future of the Palestinian Arabs.
2 75
D. The Arab View
The Arab position "demand[s] the elimination or dismember-
ment of Israel, either by 'the liquidation of all traces of aggression' of
1948 and 1967" or by "the establishment of a 'Palestinian State'
where Moslems, Christians, and Jews will live in peace. '2 76 Advo-
cates of Palestinian self-determination believe that a single secular
state over the entire mandate territory would eliminate the only bone
of contention between the Arabs and the West (i.e., Palestine).
277
274. See Zafren, supra note 4, at 18, 33, referring to HCJ 390/79 (22.10.79) 19 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 148 (the "Elon Moreh" case). The Court holding, that a particular settle-
ment was contrary to customary international law, deserves a narrow reading. Id. There are
sufficient pronouncements in that case to indicate that all settlements in Judea and Samaria
could be held by the "court as having been legally established based on some security reason."
Id. at 33-34. In an earlier case the Court held the establishment of two settlements was not
illegal under international law as they were established for military purposes. Zafren, supra
note 4, at 33-34. In an earlier case the Court held the establishment of two settlements were
not illegal under international law as they were established for military purposes. Zafren,
supra note 4, at 33-34. Thus, reading the two cases together, it would seem that a civilian
settlement would be held valid if established at the initiation of the military, needed for re-
gional defense and premised on solid military reasons for safeguarding public order and secur-
ity. Id. at 34.
275. O'Brien, supra note 197.
276. CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 398. See also Cattan, supra note 101, at 164
(Cattan's solution reflects the hard-line Palestinian position: "justice requires the dismantling
of the Zionist racist political structure set up in Palestine, the return of the Palestine refugees
to their home, and the restoration of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Pales-
tinians."). One author argues that direct negotiations with Israel would involve "basically a
recognition of Israel, i.e. a guarantee for it to continue enjoying its gains." Al-Abid, Israel and
Negotiations, in CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 399. According to AI-Abid, Israel,
"[b]y calling for immediate negotiations, . . . desires to invest with legality these acts, which
have been realized through the use of force." Id. at 400. Thus, Al-Abid contends, "Israel
intends by its plea, to legalize and perpetuate its act of forcibly uprooting and dispossessing the
Palestinian people." Id. Furthermore, "[t]he only solution in which Arab Palestinian people
have faith is the liberation of Palestine from Zionist colonialism in alliance with world imperi-
alism, and the establishment of a democratic state in Palestine which shall guarantee for all,
Muslims, Christians and Jews, equal rights and duties." Id.
277. Persico, 65 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 67, 67-68 (1971). According to Persico, as-
suming "that there is a principle of self-determination and, . . . [it was] granted to the Pales-
tinians" and the Palestinians and Israelis arrived at an agreement, the hostilities in the Middle
East would still not be terminated. Id. Persico contends that the "Palestinians have been used
in a sense, as an international scapegoat in the Arab-Israeli situation and that while actually
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This policy is consistent with the Palestine National Charter and re-
cent Arab resolutions, such as the Khartoum Resolution. 278 They
fail, however, to take cognizance of the reality that the objective of
most proponents of a Palestinian State is the destruction of the State
of Israel.
279
Israel, on the other hand, believes that with the exception of
Egypt, the Arabs' refusal to negotiate with her directly reflects the
Arabs' unreadiness to coexist in the area with Israel.280 The Israelis
assert that the chances for peace are remote without a direct dialogue
between the parties concerned. 281 Nevertheless, Jordan and Israel are
the Palestinian states and only they can solve the problem.
282
E. Proposed Solutions to the Problem of the
West Bank and Gaza
A variety of viable alternatives to either annexation of the West
Bank, a single secular state, or territorial compromise have been pro-
posed. On the one hand, Yoram Dinstein, rector of Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, professor and former diplomat, proposes that Israeli settlers stay
the Palestinian problem is a very real one, it is only a very small part of the total picture, which
is that there are definite clashes of interests existing between the states of Syria, Jordan, and
Egypt which will not be resolved by means of the settlement of the Palestinian question." Id.
at 68; but see Bassiouni I, supra note 12, at 69 (arguing "that the central issue in what is called
the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the Palestinian conflict").
278. See Khartoum Resolution, supra note 162. See also Palestine National Charter, re-
printed in CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 1089. Article 19 of the Palestine National
Charter reads:
The Partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are
entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the
will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and incon-
sistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particu-
larly the right of self-determination.
CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 447. Article 29 of the Palestine National Charter
reads:
The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and generic legal right to liberate
and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards
all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-a-vis the Palestinian case
and the extent of the support they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the
aims of the Palestinian people.
Id. at 450-51.
279. Rostow, supra note 2, at 171. See van den Haag, Many Years Off, N.Y. Times, Nov.
13, 1985, at 27, col. 3.
280. CRESCENT AND STAR, supra note 105, at 398.
281. Id.
282. Lewis, Israel's Bitter Harvest, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1985, § 6 (magazine), at 32, 42.
Lewis argues that "[t]he fate of the West Bank is not going to be decided by American inter-
vention or any other magic from the sky. It depends largely on the two peoples concerned,
Israelis and Palestinians." Id. at 45.
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where they are while the territory reverts from Israeli to Jordanian
control z.2 3 He "rules out the possibility of a Palestinian Arab State
and sees Jordanian control as the sole alternative to Israeli rule.
'28 4
On the other hand, Ehud Olmert, a Likud foreign policy expert,
articulates a functional, rather than territorial compromise.285 He
proposes a solution based on a division of governmental functions be-
tween Jordan and Israel, rather than a division of the territory or a
shift in sovereignty. 286 Olmert bases his proposal on the Camp David
Accords, but envisages a greater role for Jordan.28 7 He contends that
failure to grasp the opportunity "to start a process that would reduce
the tensions in the area and give Palestinian Arabs a political identity
...might eventually force Israel to annex the West Bank.288
By contrast, Ernest van den Haag,289 asserts that "the national
283. Bienstock, Israeli Abroad: Could Jews Live as Foreigners in a Peaceful Jordanian
West Bank?, Jewish Week, Jan. 11, 1985, at 23, col. 1.
284. Id. See Bailey, If There's To Be a State for the Palestinians, It Must Be the Already-
Palestinian Jordan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at 27, col. 4 (asserting that "there is little
reason for Jordan not to represent the Palestinians."). Furthermore, two-thirds of all Pales-
tinians are citizens of Jordan, and two-thirds of all Jordanians are Palestinians. Id. The capi-
tal city of Jordan, Amman, is composed of eighty percent Palestinians. Id. Moreover,
"Palestinians are integrated fully into most aspects of national life." Id.; see also Kvart, West
Bank: A New Solution for a New Reality, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1984, at 5, col. 1 (Kuart advo-
cates a "confederation of Israel, Jordan and the West Bank with the [West Bank] being a bi-
national state. Thus, by avoiding annexation, the democratic character of Israel would be
preserved."); Perlmutter, How Close Is Middle Eastern Peace? It's Up to Peres, Hussein, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1985, at 27, col. 1 (contending that only an eventual Israeli-Jordanian confed-
eration would leave out "extremists-Israeli annexationists, Arab rejectionists, and those who
yearn for a Palestinian state."); Avineri, West Bank Options, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 18, 1986, at
10, col. 1. Avineri, a professor of political science at the Hebrew University and a former
director-general of the Foreign Ministry, sees "very few chances in the immediate future for
meaningful negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, . . . [because
of] King Hussein's strategy [which has] put an effective veto power on such negotiations in the
hands of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat,. . . Hussein's recent rapprochement with Syria, .
[and] the PLO's utter refusal to endorse UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 .
Id. Thus, Avineri questions whether the "Jordanian option" is viable at present. Instead,
Avineri argues for a set of policy options affecting the quality of life on the West Bank and
Gaza. Id. Avineri suggests the "restoration of effective local control on the municipal level,
incorporation of villages into regional councils, the appointment of Palestinian Arabs to head
the various administrative departments on the West Bank to replace current Israeli military
personnel, the introduction of an effective banking system and economic investment in the
West Bank. Id.
285. Olmert, supra note 218, at 47.
286. Id. According to Olmert, Jordan would supervise the civilian interests of the West
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aspirations of the Palestinians, however reasonable they may sound,
are all too likely to pave the way for the annihilation of Israel. . . [as
stated in the PLO Charter, thus] it would be suicidal to give up [the]
territories. ' 290 Van den Haag further contends that the only solution,
therefore, is "to wait and hope that Arab ideology will change...
[because] premature diplomacy, . . . puts pressure on Israel to do
what it clearly cannot do."
291
V. CONCLUSION
The conflicting national aspirations of both the Palestinian Arabs
and most Israelis and diaspora Jews are focused on the West Bank.
292
On the one hand, the Palestinian Arabs view the area as the remnant
of historic Palestine, and the location for the establishment of a Pales-
tinian State.293 On the other hand, many Israelis and diaspora Jews
either cite national, historic or legal justifications for their return to
Judea and Samaria, 294 or seek the retention of that territory by Israel
for vital security interests.
295
According to one commentator, "legally, politically, and strate-
gically, the. . . solution for the Palestinian problem is peace between
Israel and Jordan in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338.
''296
Such a settlement is the only way to resolve the problem of Palestine
in a manner fulfilling the terms of the mandate and of the Security
Council resolutions. 297 The concept of "self-determination," in the
sense of an independent national state, does not apply to the Palestin-
ian Arabs.298 The principle of self-determination bears a direct rela-
tionship to other principles, such as territorial integrity, security and
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Friedman, Norden, Moulton & Bandler, Looking For Peaceful Solutions, PRESENT
TENSE, Spring 1985, at 7.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Kaufmann, supra note 222, at 110.
296. Rostow, supra note 2, at 168. "Unfreezing the deadlock affecting the West Bank and
Gaza is impossible without active Jordanian participation in the peace process ...... supra
note 247, at 39.
297. See Rostow, supra note 2, at 168. See also Olmert, supra note 218, at 47.
298. See Weiler, Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: The Art of the Impossible
and the Possible, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 287, 326-27 (1982) ("[p]rogress toward peace in the Mid-
dle East. . . would not be significantly advanced by suggesting as a solution to the conflict the
creation of a Palestinian state led by the PLO, even if that state would recognize and accept
Israel.").
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peace. 299 Unless there is a binding recognition by Arab States of
Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries, and
until the PLO and related groups, the so-called "sole representatives"
of the Palestinians, accept a form of self-determination which is con-
sonant with Israel's security, self-determination, in the sense of decid-
ing one's ultimate destiny, will not apply to the Palestinians. Perhaps,
as Professor Meron of the New York Univeristy Law School suggests,
any future exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians would be
part of a "package of principles" which would provide the Palestini-
ans with a measure of free expression in relation to the interests and
requirements of all the parties in the area.300
Recently, hopeful signs that negotiations between Israel and Jor-
dan would materialize under the umbrella of international auspices
evaporated after King Hussein ended efforts to work out a joint strat-
egy with the PLO for peace talks. 301 Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Min-
ister Shimon Peres, while agreeing with King Hussein "that a period
of 'reflection' is in order after the rupture of talks between the PLO
and Jordan" emphasized the necessity to "consider interim solutions
to provide more autonomy for the Palestinians .... -302 Thus,
Peres is considering implementing measures to foster self-rule among
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 30 3 The Palestinians,
however, are the only ones who can take control of their own future.
Meanwhile Jewish settlement is inexorably increasing and time is not
standing still. And only time will tell whether a period qf reflection
will lead to peace negotiations or whether the possibility for a peaceful
solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict is illusory.
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301. See The Mideast Mirage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at 26, col. 1. According to the
New York Times, "[l]ost somewhere in the desert air is King Hussein's much-heralded vow to
finally start negotiating with Israel." Id. King Hussein asserted that "[i]f given the cover of an
international conference and the reassurance of more American arms. . . he would engage the
Israelis at last, with Palestinians at his side. And if Arafat refused to approve, the King would
show up anyway. . . . [However] Jordan .. .reneged again .... ." Id.
302. Miller, Peres Says He'll Foster Palestinian Self-Rule, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at
17, col. 1.
303. Id. For example, Peres is considering nominating mayors for key towns in the West
Bank, promoting freedom of movement between Jordan and the occupied territories, and coor-
dinating appointments to local posts with Jordan. Id.
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